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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
 North Korea has been a constant national security challenge for the United States. 
For decades, it has pursued nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development in violation 
of treaties, agreements, and norms, threating peace and stability in East Asia. It has also 
emerged as a threat in cyberspace. It has been implicated in numerous cyberspace 
operations against the United States and South Korea. In a statement before the Senate 
Armed Service Committee, Admiral Michael Rogers, commander of United States Cyber 
Command, listed North Korea among the nations of greatest concern in cyberspace.1 
However, the threat in cyberspace that North Korea poses is not well understood at worst 
and not well articulated at best. It is also assumed that because North Korea has no 
significant reliance on the internet, it possesses no significant vulnerabilities in 
cyberspace. These misunderstandings and assumptions are due to the difficulties created 
by the secretive nature of North Korea and the nascent and dynamic nature of cyberspace. 
 This thesis will answer the fundamental questions of what North Korean 
capabilities and intent in cyberspace are and what North Korean threats and 
vulnerabilities are associated with these. The thesis will begin by introducing the research 
approaches and challenges, as well as the significance of adversary activities and 
operations in cyberspace in chapter one. Chapter two will provide background on conflict 
in cyberspace, North Korea’s national security environment, and North Korea’s 
conventional capabilities and strategy. Chapter three will discuss the frameworks and 
                                                 
1 Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee. Statement of Admiral Michael S. Rogers, Commander, 
United States Cyber Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, by Michael Rogers. 5 April 
2016. Web. 
2 
methodologies used for subsequent analysis. Chapter four will analyze the threats and 
vulnerabilities associated with North Korea as evidenced by its cyber power, which 
includes its resources and strategy. Chapter five will analyze the threats and 
vulnerabilities associated with North Korea as evidenced by cyberspace operations both 
by it and against it. Chapter six will discuss the subsequent conclusions. The thesis will 
conclude by discussing the United States national security implications of this analysis 
and providing policy recommendations in chapter six. 
 
Arguments 
 Valerians and Maness propose a theory of cyber restraint and regionalism, 
claiming that most state interaction in cyberspace can be characterized as limited to 
restrained offensive cyberspace operations or cyber espionage and focused between 
regional actors.2 To test this theory, the authors compiled the Dyadic Cyber Incident and 
Dispute Dataset (DCIDD), which covers cyber events from 2001 to 2011. However, there 
have been numerous events involving North Korea since then. This thesis argues that 
consistent with the theory, cyberspace operations by North Korea have remained focused 
primarily on South Korea over the United States and limited to offensive cyberspace 
operations and cyber espionage with minimal effect on South Korean and United States 
national security. It also argues that traditional disruption or denial approaches to 
cyberspace operations against North Korea, which have allegedly targeted strategic 
programs inside North Korea, focus on the wrong asset. Although North Korea values 
                                                 
2 Valeriano, Brandon and Ryan Maness. Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the 
International System. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015. Print. 
3 
these programs, it also values its ability to control cyberspace within North Korea and its 
ability to engage in cyberspace activities and operations from abroad. These arguments 
are formalized as follows: 
• Hypothesis 1: North Korea’s cyberspace resources and capabilities have 
increased and have now reached a level that represents an advanced persistent 
threat. 
 
• Hypothesis 2: Despite this increase, North Korea’s cyberspace operations 
have remained restrained (produced minimal effects on South Korean and 
United States national security) and regional (targeted South Korea over the 
United States). 
 
• Hypothesis 3: North Korea’s valuable assets include its ability to control 
cyberspace within North Korea and its ability to engage in cyberspace 
activities and operations from abroad. 
 
 
Research Approaches and Challenges 
 The main challenge for this thesis is finding reliable and/or verifiable information 
on North Korean cyberspace activities. Attribution in cyberspace is difficult, and entities 
affected by malicious activity are often reluctant to disclose information for various 
reasons. North Korea in particular is secretive by nature and reveals little information 
about itself. However, there are various methods for attribution, and most cyber events 
that are significant enough to be relevant for analysis often have information released by 
government authorities and/or network security companies. In fact, because events can 
affect both military and civilian entities and direct evidence can be left behind on the 
systems and networks of these victims, analysis can actually be easier. Although North 
Korea maintains strict control over information, there are also human sources with direct 
and indirect access to this controlled information. 
4 
 In addition, there is the challenge of addressing “creeping validity” and “threat 
inflation.” In the former, “possibly” becomes “likely,” “likely” becomes “certainly,” and 
a presumption becomes established as a conclusion without any new evidence having 
been introduced.3 In the latter, through misunderstanding or misrepresentation, concern 
for a threat is created that goes beyond the scope and urgency that is justified by informed 
and impartial analysis.4 When an attempt at simply probing or phishing is described as a 
“cyberattack” or a “hack,” and a suspicion or an assumption regarding the identity of the 
perpetrator is presented as a conclusion, the available information must be carefully 
analyzed. 
 
Significance 
 Activities related to cyberspace, such as offensive cyberspace operations, cyber 
exploitation, cyber espionage, and cybersecurity are a concern not only for the United 
States, but also for the international community. A review of the United Nations 
resolutions related to cyberspace provides evidence for the increasing significance of 
these activities; from simply preventing the misuse of information technologies in 2001, 
to eventually creating an international culture of cybersecurity and accounting for 
national efforts to protect critical information infrastructures in 2010.5 Despite this 
increasing significance, however, cybersecurity efforts are still lagging. As of 2017, only 
                                                 
3 Clarke, Richard and Robert Knake. Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What To Do 
about It. New York, NY: Harpers Collins Publishers, 2010. Print. 
4 Thrall, Trevor and Jane Cramer. American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation since 
9/11. New York, NY: Routledge, 2009. Web. 
5 “UN Resolutions Related to Cybersecurity.” International Telecommunication Union, N.D. Web. 
5 
38 percent of countries have published a cybersecurity strategy and only 50 percent are in 
the process of developing a strategy.6 
 Cyberspace is especially significant for the United States. According to a 
statement by the former Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, “[cyberspace] 
is both a resource on which our continued security and prosperity depends and a globally 
contested medium within which threats manifest themselves.”7 Within cyberspace, the 
United States considers North Korea (in addition to Russia, China, and Iran) to be among 
the most concerning of these threats. According to the Worldwide Threat Assessment of 
the US Intelligence Community:8 
[North Korea] has previously conducted cyberattacks against US commercial 
entities—specifically, Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014—and remains capable 
of launching disruptive or destructive cyberattacks to support its political 
objectives. [North Korea] also poses a cyber threat to US allies. South Korean 
officials have suggested that North Korea was probably responsible for the 
compromise and disclosure of data in 2014 from a South Korean nuclear plant. 
 
To maintain security and prosperity, understanding and addressing North Korean 
activities in cyberspace is a concern for both the United States and the international 
community.  
                                                 
6 “Half of All Countries Aware but Lacking National Plan on Cybersecurity, UN Agency Reports.” United 
Nations, 5 July 2017. Web. 
7 Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee. Foreign Cyber Threats to the United States, by James 
Clapper. 5 January 2017. Web. 
8 Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence 
Community, by Daniel Coats. 11 May 2017. Web. 
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CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND 
 
 Cyberspace operations, which refers primarily to government actions that are 
associated with a specific national goal, do not occur in isolation. All operations, both in 
cyberspace and traditional domains, occur within the context of an established national 
security environment. It is the perceived internal and external threats that comprise this 
environment and that motivate national capabilities and strategy, of which cyberspace is a 
single aspect. As such, to understand North Korea’s cyberspace operations, it is necessary 
to understand its conventional capabilities and strategy as well. 
 
Conflict in Cyberspace 
 The actors behind the malicious activity in cyberspace are diverse and include any 
individual or group with the capability and intent. Although the lines are sometimes 
blurred, the greatest distinction in regard to capability and intent can be made between 
state and non-state actors. State actors often have a capability that is more advanced and 
an intent that is more related to political or military goals. 
 Because the norms of behavior in cyberspace have not yet been established or 
codified, the nature of the interaction between state actors is ambiguous. The greatest 
ambiguity is whether certain malicious activity constitutes a cyberwar or whether it could 
even be considered an act of (traditional) war. Although there is much debate about 
whether a cyberwar will occur, there is some agreement that it has not yet occurred and 
7 
that the malicious activity in cyberspace between state actors constitutes cyber conflict at 
worst, remaining restricted in scope and intensity.9, 10 
 A distinction in regard to the malicious activity that does occur can be made 
between exploitative incidents and disruptive incidents, which differ by ultimate effect. 
In an exploitative incident, sensitive information or data is compromised. This is 
commonly referred to as cyber espionage. In a disruptive incident, physical or virtual 
operations are hindered. These are commonly referred to as offensive cyberspace 
operations. These respective incidents are not mutually exclusive, as cyber espionage is 
often preparation for an offensive cyberspace operation. A policy brief from the Center 
for International and Security Studies at Maryland suggests that most incidents are 
exploitative and even for those that are disruptive, the scope, magnitude, and duration of 
most incidents constitutes a nuisance at worst.11 
 Among the actors in cyberspace, there are some that are considered an advanced 
persistent threat (APT), in contrast to a traditional threat. Opinions on the characteristics 
that constitute an APT are varied. According to the rather extensive definition provided 
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, there are four distinguishing 
characteristics of an APT: (1) specific targets and goals, (2) high degree of organization 
and high amount of resources, (3) extended operations and repeated attempts, and (4) 
stealth and evasive techniques.12 
                                                 
9 Rid, Thomas. “Cyber War Will Not Take Place.” Journal of Strategic Studies 35.1 (2012): 5-32. Web. 
10 Stone, John. “Cyber War Will Take Place.” Journal of Strategic Studies 36.1 (2013): 101-108. Web. 
11 Gallagher, Nancy and Charles Harry. “Categorizing and Assessing Disruptive Cyber Incidents.” College 
Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, April 2017. Web. 
12 Chen, Ping, Lieven Desmet, and Christophe Huygens. “A Study on Advanced Persistent Threats.” IFIP 
International Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security 2014. 25-26 September 2014. Web. 
8 
 Malware and malicious code are the main weapons of cyberwar and cyber 
conflict. Although malware and malicious code are often synonymous with each other, 
the former can be thought of more as a program and the latter more as a script. There are 
three basic types of malware and malicious code that are classified based on the nature of 
propagation and execution: (1) trojans, (2) viruses, and (3) worms.13 A trojan is piece of 
malware that is disguised as a legitimate program but also performs a function that is not 
authorized by the user, hence the name. It is unable to self-replicate, requiring that an 
unsuspecting user execute it. Although viruses and worms are able to self-replicate, a 
virus is executed by being attached to a host program and a worm is not. From here, 
further classification becomes complicated. The functions of malware and malicious code 
are varied and not restricted to a certain type. Individual malware and malicious code can 
have multiple functions and the various types can be embedded within each other. In 
general, however, malware and malicious code can be used to provide remote-access (ex: 
backdoors), monitor, collect and exfiltrate data (ex: packet sniffers, listeners, and 
keystroke loggers), modify or destroy data (ex: logic bombs and wipers), download or 
deploy additional malware (ex: downloaders and droppers), or conceal activities (ex: 
rootkits). 
 Attribution of malicious activity in cyberspace is notoriously difficult. There are a 
few reasons for this.14 First, because of the global nature of cyberspace, an event can 
occur from a connected source anywhere in the world against a connected target 
anywhere in the world. Second, even if the source of an event is determined, the owner of 
                                                 
13 “Malicious Programs.” Blog post. SecureList, N.D. Web. 
14 Singer, P.W. and Alan Friedman. Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. Print. 
9 
a system or network is not necessarily aware that it was used for malicious activity. That 
is, it is possible that the actual perpetrator had remote-access. Third, even if it is 
determined that the perpetrator had remote-access, it is not necessarily possible to 
identify the perpetrator. 
 Despite these difficulties, attribution to some degree is possible. 15 In fact, the 
greater the scale of an operation, such as that characteristic of a state actor, the greater the 
chance that crucial evidence is left behind (for example, logs from target systems and 
networks or direct connections from source internet protocol (IP) addresses). Analysis of 
this evidence, in addition to the tools, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) of the operation, can 
be used to determine a source. Many aspects of the TTPs can be revealing. For example, 
to maximize operational efficiency and reduce logistical cost, threat actors often reuse the 
same infrastructure for operations, such as the same internet service providers or servers. 
Because malware can be complex to develop, it is often modular, with threat actors 
reusing the same or similar modules for multiple operations. As operations often adhere 
to schedules and routines, the pattern of life of behind an operation provides evidence as 
to the location and identity of the threat actor; for example, timing that coincides with 
certain national holidays, local time zones, or institutional habits. Language preferences, 
conventions, and errors in malware can reveal the native language of the threat actor, as 
well as even background or experience. All this evidence, most importantly, can be used 
to connect a series of operations. 
                                                 
15 Rid, Thomas and Ben Buchanan. “Attributing Cyber Attacks” Journal of Strategic Studies 38.1-2 (2015): 
4-37. Web. 
10 
 Valeriano and Maness advocate, however, for going beyond simply using a 
forensic model of attribution and propose that in the context of international relations, 
attribution can be made to a high degree of confidence.16 This is especially applicable to 
North Korea, which has obvious targets and goals. For example, even if there is little 
forensic evidence directly implicating North Korea in a distributed denial of service 
(DDOS) operation that targets South Korea and the United States on Independence Day 
or in an offensive cyberspace operation that wipes the hard drives of media corporations 
and financial institutions in South Korea days after North Korea promises retribution, the 
most likely perpetrator is obvious. In fact, through offensive cyberspace operations, a 
perpetrator is often able to simultaneously gain the benefits of signaling (and thus achieve 
a political goal) while also avoiding the consequences of such operations by maintaining 
plausible deniability. In addition, although there is the potential for these to be “false 
flag” operations in which a perpetrator attempts to falsely implicate North Korea, 
validation of this suspicion requires that there is a more compelling threat actor than 
North Korea that also has the means, motive, and opportunity. 
 
North Korean National Security Environment 
 North Korea remains arguably economically and diplomatically the most isolated 
nation in the world. This isolation is in part self-imposed and due to the guiding national 
ideology of Juche (self-reliance or self-determination), which advocates the protection of 
the ruling regime and the idea that because North Korea is under constant threat, to 
                                                 
16 Valeriano, Brandon and Ryan Maness. Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the 
International System. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015. Print. 
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survive it must remain economically and militarily reliant on no other nation.17 Its 
isolation is also in part due to its development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles 
in violation of or disregard for international treaties, agreements, and norms.18 This 
development has brought about harsh economic and diplomatic sanctions from most 
members of the international community. North Korea is also guided by the national 
policy of Songun (military-first), which prioritizes the military in the conduct of state 
affairs and the allocation of resources. 
 North Korea perceives external threats from the expanding gap in national power 
between itself and South Korea and from an increasing distrust of the regional state actors 
and former allies of China and Russia.19 There is also the immediate threat perceived in 
the presence of South Korean and United States armed forces stationed on the peninsula, 
as well as the potential threat perceived in the United States nuclear deterrent. North 
Korea, in particular the ruling regime, perceives internal vulnerabilities in decreasing 
economic control over the population20 and increasing flow of information other than 
state-sanctioned media into and within the nation.21 
 North Korea’s overall national goals are to perpetually maintain the rule of the 
current political regime and to eventually reunify the peninsula.22 To achieve these goals, 
                                                 
17 “Venerating the Kims: Just One More Religion?” The Economist, 7 April 2013. Web. 
18 North Korea withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2003, has never 
joined the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty or Missile Technology Control Regime, and admitted 
in 2003 that it had violated the Agreed Framework. 
19 Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Military and Security Developments 
Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2015. 2015. Web. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Fang, Arnold. “North Korea’s Self-Imposed Isolation.” The Diplomat, 15 March 2016. Web. 
22 Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Military and Security Developments 
Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2015. 2015. Web. 
12 
and in light of a military that is powerful in terms of quantity but not in terms of quality,23 
its capabilities and strategy have focused on asymmetrical and irregular warfare, in 
particular through the use of special operations forces, as well as nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons. 
 
North Korean Conventional Capabilities and Strategy 
 North Korea’s national security apparatus is coordinated under the authority of 
the Central Military Committee and the National Defense Commission, both of which are 
chaired by the Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un. The military is represented by the Ministry 
of People’s Armed Forces, which exercises control over the Korean People’s Armed 
Forces (KPAF). 24 The KPAF includes the Ground Force, Navy, Air Force, Strategic 
Missile Force, and Special Operations Force. The KPAF is dominated by the Ground 
Force, most of which is stationed near the demilitarized zone between North Korea and 
South Korea. It maintains an active force strength of 1.2 million military personnel and a 
reserve force strength of 7.6 million, with an additional 200,000 special operations 
personnel.25 In comparison, allied forces consist of 655,000 South Korean and 23,500 
United States military personnel.26 
                                                 
23 Laurence, Jeremy. “North Korea Military Has an Edge over South, but Wouldn't Win a War, Study 
Finds.” The Christian Science Monitor, 4 January 2012. Web. 
24 The KPAF is more traditionally referred to as the Korean People’s Army (KPA), with the main 
constituent branches referred to as the KPA-Ground Force, KPA-Navy, and KPA-Air Force. The 
alternative translation proposed here is more accurate and is used to avoid confusion. 
25 McCafferty, Georgia. “Anniversary Parade Provides Rare Glimpse into North Korea's Military Might.” 
CNN, 10 October 2015. Web. 
26 Price, Greg. “U.S. Military Presence in Asia: Troops Stationed in Japan, South Korea, and Beyond.” 
Newsweek, 26 April 2017. Web. 
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 Despite these numbers, North Korea’s military relies on personnel that are 
undertrained and undernourished and on equipment that is obsolete.27 Most of the 
military systems are overburdened and outdated, being produced in or based on designs 
from China and the Soviet Union from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. However, Kim Jong-
un has placed an emphasis on the development of modern systems. 
 According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, North Korea has 
focused its efforts on developing and expanding asymmetric warfare capabilities, 
including weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and special operations and 
cyberwarfare capabilities.28 As evidence for this, it has conducted five nuclear tests, with 
the most recent in September 2016.29 It has continued and even intensified tests of 
ballistic missiles, in particular the submarine-launched KN-11 and the mobile-launched 
KN-15 (a variant of the KN-11), with the initial test for the KN-11 in December 2014 and 
for the KN-15 in February 2017.30 Its special operations units are among the best-trained 
and best-equipped in the military. 
 North Korea’s military strategy is derived from guidance provided by the Soviet 
Union and experience gained during the guerrilla resistance against Japan. It is offensive 
in nature and focused on the use of overwhelming surprise, speed, and force with 
asymmetrical and irregular capabilities to counter the conventional strength of the armed 
                                                 
27 Blair, David. “North Korea v. South Korea: How the Countries' Armed Forces Compare.” The 
Telegraph, 15 September 2015. Web. 
28 Cordesman, Anthony. “Korean Peninsula Military Modernization Trends.” Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 20 September 2016. Web. 
29 “Missiles of North Korea.” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, N.D. Web. 
30 Ibid. 
14 
forces of South Korea and the United States.31 This is embodied in the doctrine of “Fast 
War, Fast End” and demonstrated in the structuring and stationing of the military. 
Its military strategy is also characterized by belligerence and provocation, consisting of 
rhetoric and confrontation that is sometimes violent yet below the threshold for an act of 
war, which is used to gain concession from regional adversaries.32  
                                                 
31 Hodge, Home. “North Korea’s Military Strategy.” Parameters 33 (2013): 68-81. Web. 
32 Sullivan, Tim. “North Korea and its Provocations: Belligerence as Strategy.” The Washington Times, 9 
February 2016. Web. 
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CHAPTER III: FRAMEWORKS AND METHODOLOGIES 
 
 There are four background topics that must be understood before answering the 
research questions presented in this thesis: (1) how threat and vulnerability are 
conceptualized in relation to risk, (2) how the cyber threat is assessed, (3) how 
cyberspace and cyberspace operations are defined, and (4) how the target is analyzed. 
 Topic one is addressed through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Risk Lexicon. Topic two is addressed through two sets of frameworks and 
methodologies. The first, from the Sandia National Laboratories Operational Threat 
Assessment (OTA), is used to analyze cyber threat actors and considers the factors of 
commitment attributes and resource attributes. The second, from the Valeriano and 
Maness DCIDD, is used to analyze cyber events and considers the factors of method, 
severity, interaction, target, and goal. Topic three is addressed through two Department of 
Defense (DOD) joint publications, 3-13 on information operations and 3-12 (R) on 
cyberspace operations, as well as Army Field Manual 3-38 on cyber electromagnetic 
activities. Topic four is addressed through a target-centric approach. 
 
Conceptualizing Risk 
 The DHS conceptualizes risk as being comprised of a scenario, a threat, a 
vulnerability, and a consequence as depicted in Figure 1.33 Within a scenario, a threat 
exploits a vulnerability, which then has a consequence. The scenario includes a target, an 
adversary, an attack method, and an attack path. The attack method refers to the tools and 
                                                 
33 Department of Homeland Security. DHS Risk Lexicon, September 2008. Web. 
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tactics, and the attack path refers to the phases of planning, developing, and executing. 
The threat is comprised of the capability and intent of the adversary. Because of this 
inherent relationship, the term ‘threat’ often refers to the adversary as an actor itself and 
not necessarily a combination of its capability and intent. To avoid confusion, the term 
‘threat actor’ is used to maintain a distinction. The vulnerability is an attribute of an 
entity that renders it vulnerable to exploitation and thus exposes an asset that has value to 
the adversary. A consequence includes effects that are operational, psychological, 
physical, and/or economic. 
 
 
Figure 1. Department of Homeland Security Elements of Risk. 
 
 To put these elements of risk in context, an unsecured system or network can be a 
vulnerability, but only if there is an asset on that system or network worth protecting by 
an owner or worth acquiring by an adversary. The adversary can be a threat to this 
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unsecured network, but only if it has the means and motives (the capability and intent) to 
exploit the vulnerability. It is this framework that is used to establish the fundamental 
elements that must be considered in discussing the issue of North Korean in cyberspace. 
 
Defining Cyberspace and Cyberspace Operations 
 Cyberspace and cyberspace operations are notoriously difficult to define due to 
the nascent and dynamic nature of these concepts. Approaches to defining concepts can 
be either normative or descriptive. DOD joint publications represent a more normative 
approach. Joint Publication 3-13, the DOD guidance on information operations, states 
that “cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the 
interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, 
including the internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded 
processors and controllers”.34 Within this definition, there is an implication that 
cyberspace has both a physical aspect (“the interdependent network of information 
technology infrastructures”) and a virtual aspect (“[the] resident data”). 
 Joint Publication 3-12 (R), the DOD guidance on cyberspace operations, 
categorizes cyberspace operations based on intent into offensive cyberspace operations 
(OCO), defensive cyberspace operations (DCO), and DOD information network 
(DODIN) operations.35 It defines OCO as “the application of force in or through 
cyberspace” and DCO as “passive and active cyberspace defense operations to preserve 
the ability to use [cyberspace] capabilities and protect data, networks, network-centric 
                                                 
34 Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations, 2014. Web. 
35 Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-12 (R): Cyberspace Operations, 2013. Web. 
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capabilities, and other designated systems”.36 Previous versions of the guidance referred 
to OCO more narrowly as computer network attack (CNA) and DCO more narrowly as 
computer network defense (CND), and included computer network exploitation (CNE). 
CNE, which was considered an aspect of intelligence, is now referred to more broadly as 
cyberspace intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (CISR) and is conceptualized 
as supporting both OCO and DCO. In addition to intent, Joint Publication 3-12 (R) also 
categorizes cyberspace operations based on capability as follows: 
• Cyberspace attack: Actions in cyberspace to deny access to or use of, as well 
as manipulate the information, information systems, and/or information 
networks of an adversary. Denial involves efforts to degrade (a function of 
amount), disrupt (a function of time), and destroy (a function of both amount 
and time). Manipulation involves efforts to control or alter. 
 
• Cyberspace defense: Actions in cyberspace to secure and defend the 
information, information systems, and/or information networks of an owner 
against an adversary. Activities include the actions of protecting, detecting, 
characterizing, countering, and mitigating. 
 
• Cyberspace intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance: Actions in 
cyberspace to collect intelligence that is required to support current and future 
operations, including OCO and DCO. 
 
 Guidance from the Army, Field Manual 3-12, integrates the concept of 
cyberspace operations with the concept of electronic warfare operations.37 It refers to this 
as cyber electromagnetic activities. This can be understood as a shifting of focus from the 
virtual aspect of cyberspace in Joint Publication 3-12 (R) to the physical aspect. Through 
cyber electromagnetic activities, the Army can plan, integrate, and synchronize the 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 Department of Defense, United States Army. Field Manual 3-12: Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare 
Operations, April 2017. Web. 
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missions of OCO, DCO, and DODIN with electronic attack, electronic protection, 
electronic warfare support, and spectrum management operations. 
 Singer and Friedman represent a more descriptive approach to defining 
cyberspace and cyberspace operations. Although the authors state that “cyberspace is the 
realm of computer networks and [users] in which information is stored, shared, and 
communicated online”, the focus is on describing the essential and unique features of 
cyberspace.38 Cyberspace, as also defined in Joint Publication 3-13, is foremost an 
information environment and is characterized by the creation, manipulation, transfer, and 
storage of data. However, it is also the information systems, networks, and infrastructures 
that allow these activities to occur. As such, to emphasize, the most important feature of 
cyberspace is that it has both a physical aspect and a virtual aspect. 
 There are additional features of cyberspace that distinguish it from the traditional 
domains of air, land, and sea. Cyberspace obscures conventional geopolitical boundaries, 
it is artificial and therefore easily and quickly changes (at least relative to the other 
domains), and activities within it can occur both in an instant and from a distance. 
Regarding obscuring conventional geopolitical boundaries, it is a common misconception 
that this means that cyberspace is a global commons, such as sea or space. However, as 
emphasized earlier, cyberspace does have a physical aspect. This means that even if it is 
global by virtue of being expansive and interconnected, elements of the infrastructure still 
reside within sovereign territories that can exercise control over it. The tendency by those 
in national security to forget the importance of this was even noted by Michael Hayden, 
                                                 
38 Singer, P.W. and Alan Friedman. Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. Print. 
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the former Director of the NSA and former Director of the CIA, who stated that “DOD’s 
construct of a separate domain tended to mute the traditional principles and 
responsibilities of sovereignty.”39 Although this discussion of attributes is not exhaustive, 
it does paint a picture of the nature of cyberspace adequate for this thesis. 
 Singer and Friedman use the availability, integrity, and confidentiality (AIC) 
triad40 from the concept of information security to categorize cyberspace operations 
according to the element of the triad that is threatened.41 Availability operations are those 
that deny access to a system or network. These are equivalent to the denial activities of 
DOD cyberspace attack. Integrity operations are those that penetrate systems or networks 
to manipulate information. These are equivalent to the manipulation activities of DOD 
cyberspace attack. Confidentiality operations are those that penetrate systems or networks 
to monitor activities and exfiltrate information. This is equivalent to DOD cyberspace 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. 
 With all these operations, it is important to consider the consequence in the 
context of national security. Although both are confidentiality operations, the theft of 
credit card information from a retail business is much different than the theft of 
background investigation information from a government organization or weapon system 
designs from a defense contractor. An availability operation against a government 
                                                 
39 Hayden, Michael. “Life in The Cyber Domain.” Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of 
Terror. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2016. Print. 
40 This is more traditionally referred to as the CIA triad, but also as the AIC triad to avoid confusion with 
the Central Intelligence Agency. 
41 Singer, P.W. and Alan Friedman. Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. Print. 
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website that denies access to services is also much different than an availability operation 
against critical infrastructure that denies access to energy or water. 
 Because inconsistent or exaggerated use of key terms can lead to 
misunderstanding or inflation of a situation, for the purposes of this thesis, these terms 
are defined and maintained as follows: 
• Cyberspace: An information environment comprised of interconnected 
systems and networks, including supporting infrastructure, and characterized 
by the creation, manipulation, storage, and transfer of information and data. 
 
• Offensive cyberspace operations: Deliberate actions to disrupt or deny access 
to information systems and networks by the adversary or to alter the integrity 
of information and data on these systems and networks through modification 
or deletion. This is popularly referred to as cyberattack. 
 
• Defense cyberspace operations: Deliberate actions to protect information 
systems and networks and ensure the availability, integrity, and confidentiality 
of the information and data on these systems and networks. This is popularly 
referred to as cybersecurity. 
 
• Cyber exploitation/Cyber espionage:42 Deliberate actions to compromise the 
confidentiality of information systems and networks used by the adversary 
through the gaining of unauthorized access to monitor activity or exfiltrate 
information and data. 
 
In addition, ‘cyberspace activity’ will refer primarily to government and civilian actions 
in cyberspace that are not associated with a specific national goal, and ‘cyberspace 
operation’ will refer primarily to government actions that are associated with a specific 
national goal. The actions of a cyberspace operation will be categorized as either 
‘offensive cyberspace operations’, ‘defensive cyberspace operations’, or ‘cyber 
exploitation/cyber espionage’ as appropriate. Other actions that are not associated with 
                                                 
42 Although used as synonymous, cyber exploitation will be used when it is unclear whether any monitoring 
or exfiltration was successful. 
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traditional political or military goals yet still represent malicious activity will be referred 
to as cybercrime. 
 
Characterizing the Cyber Threat 
 There are numerous methods for characterizing the cyber threat. These range from 
taxonomies, which classify information about the threat, to frameworks and 
methodologies, which provide a structure for understanding the threat and an approach to 
assessing it. 
 Under the DHS Risk and Vulnerability Assessment program, which was 
established to assist federal civilian government entities with assessing respective cyber 
risks and vulnerabilities, Sandia National Laboratories developed the OTA 
methodology.43 OTA was designed to assess cyber threats using consistent metrics and 
models. A generic threat matrix, which is depicted in Table 1, is used in OTA to describe 
cyber threat actors based on various attributes and then to categorize these along a 
spectrum from most capable of achieving a goal (threat level 1) to least capable of 
achieving a goal (threat level 8). That is, each level is an assessment of the threat actor 
based on its capabilities. OTA was selected for this thesis because, in addition to 
addressing capabilities in particular, it is intended to be used based on unclassified 
information. 
 
 
 
                                                 
43 Sandia National Laboratories. Categorizing Threat: Building and Using a Generic Threat Matrix, by 
David Duggan, Sherry Thomas, Cynthia Veitch, and Laura Woodard, September 2007. Web. 
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Table 1. Operational Threat Assessment Generic Threat Matrix. 
 
THREAT 
LEVEL 
THREAT PROFILE 
Commitment Attributes Resource Attributes 
Intensity Stealth Time 
Technical 
Personnel 
Cyber 
Knowledge 
Kinetic 
Knowledge 
Access 
1 H H Years/Decades Hundreds H H H 
2 H H Years/Decades Tens/Tens M H M 
3 H H Months/Years Tens/Tens H M M 
4 M H Weeks/Months Tens H M M 
5 H M Weeks/Months Tens M M M 
6 M M Weeks/Months Ones M M L 
7 M M Months/Years Tens L L L 
8 L L Days/Weeks Ones L L L 
 
 
 In the generic threat matrix, a threat profile is comprised of both commitment 
attributes and resource attributes, which together represent the capability element of a 
threat from the concept of risk. Although the measures for some attributes are 
quantitative, such as time and technical personnel, others are necessarily qualitative, such 
as intensity and stealth. These attributes and measures are defined as follows: 
• Intensity: The amount of determination and diligence that a threat actor has in 
pursuit of its goals, as well the amount of associated risk that it is willing to 
accept. (Low, Medium, or High) 
 
• Stealth: The ability of the threat actor to obscure or conceal the details about 
itself, including its goals, operations, and structures. (Low, Medium, or High) 
 
• Time: The amount of time that a threat actor is willing to dedicate to planning, 
developing, and executing operations in pursuit of its goals. (Days to Weeks, 
Weeks to Months, Months to Years, or Years to Decades) 
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• Technical personnel: The number of personnel with specialized expertise that 
the threat actor is able to use in its operations. (Ones, Tens, Tens of Tens, or 
Hundreds) 
 
• Cyber knowledge: The amount of internal theoretical and practical expertise 
related to the cyber domain that a threat actor has and its ability to use this 
expertise in pursuit of its goals. Expertise includes the ability of the threat to 
share information internally, acquire additional expertise, and conduct 
research and development. (Low, Medium, or High) 
 
• Kinetic knowledge: The amount of internal theoretical and practical expertise 
related to the kinetic domain that a threat actor has and its ability to use this 
expertise in pursuit of its goals. Expertise includes the ability of the threat to 
share information internally, acquire additional expertise, and conduct 
research and development. (Low, Medium, or High) 
 
• Access: The ability of the threat actor to penetrate a secured system or 
network through either cyber or kinetic means. (Low, Medium, or High) 
 
It is important to emphasize that the generic threat matrix is intended to simply provide a 
best possible match. It is likely that a threat actor will not have an exact fit to a level, but 
rather will share more attributes with a certain level over another. 
 In addition to this, Valeriano and Maness provide a framework and methodology 
for assessing cyberspace incidents in the context of international relations.44 As such, the 
focus is on interactions between state actors in cyberspace, although non-state entities as 
targets are considered. This framework and methodology was used to compile the 
DCIDD. The factors identified are the method, severity, interaction, target, and goal. 
From the framework of risk, roughly, the method corresponds to attack method and 
attack path, the severity corresponds to consequence, the target corresponds to target, and 
the goal corresponds to intent. The types for each of these factors is depicted in Figure 2. 
                                                 
44 Valeriano, Brandon and Ryan Maness. Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the 
International System. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015. Print. 
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It is important to note that for the authors the term ‘cyber incident’ refers to an individual 
operation and the term ‘cyber dispute’ refers to a series of operations. For the factor of 
interaction, types 4 through 6 are applicable only to cyber dispute and for the factor of 
target, types 4 through 7. 
 
FACTOR TYPES 
Method 
1. Vandalism 
2. Denial of service 
3. Intrusion 
4. Infiltration 
    4.1 Logic bomb (any type) 
    4.2 Virus 
    4.3 Worm 
    4.4 Packet sniffer (any type) 
    4.5 Keystroke logger (any type) 
5. Advanced persistent threat 
6. Vandalism and denial of service 
7. Intrusion and infiltration 
Severity 
1. Minimal effect 
2. Effect on critical national infrastructure or military 
3. Dramatic effect on national security strategy 
4. Dramatic effect on nation 
5. Catastrophic effect on nation 
Interaction 
1. Nuisance 
2. Defensive 
3. Offensive 
4. Nuisance and defensive 
5. Nuisance and offensive 
6. Nuisance, defense, and offensive 
Target 
1. Private 
2. Government non-military 
3. Government military 
4. Private and government non-military 
5. Private and government military 
6. Government (non-military and military) 
7. Private and government (non-military and military) 
Goal 
1. Disruption of target activity 
2. Acquisition of target information and data 
3. Modification of target behavior 
 
Figure 2. Factors and Types for Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute Dataset. 
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 It is also important to discuss the factor of method, the types for which are 
described in Table 2 with slight modifications to phrasing. Vandalism includes activities 
such as website defacements, and common tools include the insertion of malicious code. 
Denial of service includes activities such as DDOS attacks, and common tools include 
botnets. Intrusion includes activities such as compromising systems to allow 
unauthorized access, and common tools include trojans or backdoors. Infiltration includes 
activities such as forcing systems to conduct unauthorized activity, and common tools 
include logic bombs, viruses, worms, packet sniffers, and keystroke loggers. According 
to the authors, intrusions and infiltrations are distinguished from each other in that 
intrusions are more exploitative and general, and infiltrations are more disruptive and 
precise. Although the authors also claim that only infiltrations are the methods that states 
can claim as an act of war, the DOD document that the authors cited did not state this 
explicitly.45 From these descriptions, the method used for in operation is understood to be 
a combination of tools and tactics. 
 However, because the tools of cyberspace operations (malware or malicious code) 
represent overlapping tactics, the types as proposed encounter difficulties. The 
descriptions from Valeriano and Maness for the tools and tactics of the method used in an 
operation are also different from the classifications for the types and functions of 
malware presented earlier. For example, the authors categorize malware as infiltration, 
even though malware can have functions unrelated to infiltration. Although trojans can 
function as backdoors, backdoors are described as being different in not needing an 
operator to be installed and executed. 
                                                 
45 Department of Defense. Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, 1 July 2011. Web. 
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Table 2. Valeriano and Maness Methods of Cyberspace Operations. 
 
CODE/EVENT EXAMPLE EXPLANATION 
1. Vandalism Website defacements SQL injection or cross-scripting 
2. DOS DDOS attacks 
Botnets used to shut down websites with 
high traffic 
3. Intrusion Trapdoors or trojans, backdoors 
Software injected remotely for intrusions 
and thefts 
4. Infiltration 
Logic bombs, worms, viruses, packet 
sniffers, keystroke loggers 
Different methods that are used to 
penetrate target networks; software can be 
installed remotely or physically 
5. APT Advanced persistent threats 
Precise and sophisticated methods that 
have specific targets; methods can include 
vandalism, DOS, intrusion or APT 
6. Vandalism and 
DOS 
Cyber disputes 
Combined incidents of vandalism and 
DOS 
7. Intrusion and 
Infiltration 
Cyber disputes 
Combined incidents of intrusion and 
infiltration 
 
 
This is the difference between a trojan and a worm or virus, and remote-access is not a 
function exclusive to any of these types. Infiltration is said to include worms, viruses, 
packet sniffers, keystroke loggers, and logic bombs, even though worms and viruses can 
have functions unrelated to infiltration, and trojans can also function as packet sniffers or 
keystroke loggers. Although logic bombs are described as modifying or deleting data, the 
reason for categorizing these under intrusion instead of vandalism or denial of service is 
not clarified. In addition, although the authors note that the types for the methods used in 
cyberspace operations do not indicate a scale of severity, which is addressed in the 
severity of the operation, there does seem to be some overlap with the goal of an 
operation. 
 However, despite these discrepancies, this methodology is the most practical for 
assessing the capability and intent (among other aspects) of interactions in cyberspace. In 
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addition to the threat level from OTA that corresponds to capability, all the elements 
required for a comprehensive assessment are now present.  
 
Analyzing the Target 
 For the purposes of this thesis, it is helpful to approach the topic as a target of 
intelligence analysis. Clark advocates a target-centric approach and presents the target as 
both a system and a network (in the abstract sense not the technological sense). A system 
is comprised of three elements: (1) the structure or relationships between the entities 
within the system, (2) the function or the results or effects produced by the system, and 
(3) the processes or the activities within the system that produce the results or effects. On 
the topic of North Korean cyberspace operations, the organizations that conduct the 
operations are a system. There are managers, engineers, operators, and other entities in 
hierarchical, lateral, and other relationships that plan, develop, and execute cyberspace 
operations to achieve national goals. 
 A network is comprised of nodes and links. There are networks within systems, as 
suggested by the presence of entities (nodes) and relationships (links). However, there are 
also networks of systems. North Korean cyberspace operations do not occur in isolation. 
The organizations that conduct the activities are nodes linked to other supporting or 
opposing organizations both inside and outside of North Korea. For example, in addition 
to cyber organizations, the KPAF Air Force and KPAF Navy also support national goals 
but in traditional domains, and Chinese internet service providers facilitate North Korean 
cyberspace operations. The United States, as well as its allies and partners, however, 
attempt to hinder North Korean cyberspace activities both offensively and defensively.  
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CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS OF CYBER POWER 
 
 Although there is no single definition that is agreed upon, state power can be 
understood generally as the capacity to conduct certain activities by the state and 
specifically as the ability to use these activities to produce desirable results for the state.46 
This implies the existence of resources (that provide the capacity) and strategy (that 
guides the ability). It is the resources and strategy of a state that establish the context for 
understanding the threats it poses and the vulnerabilities it possesses. Cyberpower in 
particular is the capacity and ability to affect desirable outcomes on or in cyberspace. 
According to Nye, cyberpower is based on resources that relate to the creation, control, 
and communication of information in cyberspace, such as infrastructure and personnel.47 
The author also recognizes, however, that strategy includes instruments of cyberpower 
that are both physical and virtual, reflecting the nature of cyberspace itself. For example, 
a state can destroy systems and networks in the physical world or it can deny access to or 
manipulate the integrity of information in the virtual world. The following sections will 
discuss the cyber resources and strategy of North Korea, as well as the assessments of its 
cyberpower in comparison to other nations. 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 Tellis, Ashley, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills. “Strategic Asia 2015–16: Foundations of National 
Power in the Asia-Pacific.” Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2015. Web. 
47 Nye, Joseph. “Cyber Power.” Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, May 
2010. Web. 
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Civilian Cyber Resources and Activities 
 Although the civilian cyber infrastructure of North Korea lags far behind that of 
other nations, its development has been cautious yet consistent. Its initial internet 
connection was established by the Korea Computer Center (KCC) in 2003 via satellite 
with a German company called KCC Europe, which then for several years operated the 
‘.kp’ domain name and hosted North Korean websites.48 In 2010, after the websites 
disappeared from the internet, the KCC inquired for several months about reinstating 
service with no response from KCC Europe. It then terminated its service agreement and 
transferred its service to a company called Star Joint Venture, a joint venture between 
North Korea’s Post and Telecommunications Corporation and Thailand’s Loxley Pacific, 
which offered internet connection via landline with the Chinese state-owned enterprise 
China Unicom. Star Joint Venture started hosting North Korean websites on the internet 
in October 2010. However, the websites were accessible only by using the direct IP 
addresses until Star Joint Venture acquired official control of the ‘.kp’ domain name in 
January of 2011. Star Joint Venture remains the single internet service provider for North 
Korea. It is estimated that there are only a few thousand internet users restricted to elites 
and to foreigners, with access available only after obtaining an IP address from the 
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications and computers required to be registered with 
local authorities.49 For even these users, the government monitors activities and restricts 
access to certain websites, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.50 It has also 
                                                 
48 Williams, Martin. “North Korea's Internet Domain Is in New Hands.” PC World, 19 May 2011. Web. 
49 Boynton, Robert. “North Korea’s Digital Underground.” The Atlantic, April 2011. Web. 
50 Talmadge, Eric. “North Korea Announces Blocks on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube.” The Guardian, 1 
April 2016. Web. 
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requested that foreign embassies in North Korea that have Wi-Fi require passwords or 
decrease signal strength to prevent unauthorized access by locals.51 
 In addition to the internet, there is a domestic intranet called Kwangmyong (Bright 
Star) that was established in 2000 and is free to access by the population. Although a 
misconfiguration in a domain name server exposed 28 websites under the ‘.kp’ domain 
name to the internet in September 2016, it is estimated that there are from 1,000 to 5,000 
websites accessible only through Kwangmyong, which is operated under a different 
domain name system.52 Kwangmyong includes search and email functionality and offers a 
variety of content, including news and entertainment media and shopping. Actual usage 
statistics, unsurprisingly, are not available. 
 All computers, including those used to access both the internet and Kwangmyong, 
are installed with domestic software that is often based on open-source software. For 
example, the official operating system, Pulgunbyol (Red Star), is based off Linux and the 
official web browser, Naenara (My Country), is based off Firefox. Red Star was 
developed by the KCC in 1998, with the most recent version released in 2013.53 Other 
software that has been developed by the government includes a firewall called Nungna, 
an antivirus program called Kullaksae, and an access control solution called Pogom.54 
According to German researchers, a unique feature of Red Star is that it tags each media 
                                                 
51 Kang, Tae-jun. “Wi-Fi Access Sparks Housing Boom in Pyongyang.” The Diplomat, 14 August 2014. 
Web. 
52 Russon, Mary-Ann. “No, North Korea's Internet Doesn't Only Have 28 Websites, but Reddit Did Manage 
to Crash Them.” International Business Times, 22 September 2016. Web. 
53 Not to be confused with the government’s Naenara internet portal. 
54 Yang, Jeong-yoon, So-jeong Kim, and Il-seok Oh. “Analysis on South Korean Cybersecurity Readiness 
Regarding North Korean Cyber Capabilities.” International Workshop on Information Security 
Applications 2016. 30 March 2017. Web. 
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file with a unique identifier for the computer once it is accessed.55 It also prevents users 
from modifying basic functions of the core operating system or disabling the firewall or 
antivirus program.56 
 Analysis of a recent tablet produce around 2015 or 2016 by North Korea reveals 
an increasing sophistication in the degree of surveillance and control incorporated into 
devices.57 A program called Red Flag runs as a background process, capturing a 
screenshot every time the user opens an application, recording the browser history and 
unique identifier for the tablet, and ensuring that the core operating system is not 
modified. A tagging feature for media similar to similar to Red Star is also present. In 
addition, the installation of applications is limited to an approved whitelist. Even more 
restrictive than this, the tablet is able to access media only if it has the digital certificate 
either NATISIGN (authorized by the North Korean government) or SELFSIGN (created 
on the tablet itself). This prevents the sharing of unauthorized media between users. 
 Much of North Korea’s information technology (IT) research and development is 
done at the state-owned KCC, which was established in 1990. Despite claims of being for 
research and development, it was reported in 2001 that the KCC had actually been 
established under the initiative of Kim Jong-nam, the eldest son of Kim Jong-il, for 
foreign intelligence.58 Information from the National Intelligence Service (NIS) from 
2005 confirmed that Kim Jong-nam, who at the time was involved with security and 
                                                 
55 “North Korea's ‘Paranoid’ Computer Operating System Revealed.” The Guardian, 27 December 2015. 
Web. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Williams, Martyn. “All That Glitters Is Not Gold: A Closer Look at North Korea’s Ullim Tablet.” 38 
North, 3 March 2017. Web. 
58 이교관. “조선컴퓨터센터의 비밀.” NK Chosun, 11 May 2001. Web. 
33 
counterintelligence operations at the Ministry of State Security, used the KCC to control 
communications into and out of North Korea and to monitor and collect foreign 
intelligence.59 There are/were around 1,000 personnel at the KCC, although it has 
recently been reported that most have been sent abroad to earn money for the regime.60 
Despite possible ulterior functions and in addition to research and development, the KCC 
is also responsible for the management of computer networks and websites within the 
nation, education and training, and hardware and software distribution, with offices in 
China, Japan, and Europe. There are nine centers subordinate to the KCC:61 
1. Red Star Information Center (internet applications and multimedia) 
2. Samilpo Information Center (applications) 
3. Osandok Information Center (systems software and operating systems) 
4. Mankyong Information Center (information and communications software) 
5. Chongbong Information Center (artificial intelligence) 
6. Sobaeksu Information Center (control automation and quality engineering) 
7. Miryong Information Center (medical applications) 
8. Samjiyon Information Center (multimedia systems) 
9. Naenara Information Center (digital content production and services) 
 
 Other state-owned IT ventures, each with hundreds of personnel, include the 
Pyongyang Informatics Center, Daeyang IT Company, and Hi-Tech Development 
Company, as well as IT firms subordinate to commercial enterprises such as the Unha 
Corporation or Korea Roksan General Trading Company.62 Another venture, the 
Kwangmyong IT Center, specializes in network security, data encryption and recovery, 
and biometric identification and seems to be a spinoff of the Oun Information Center, 
                                                 
59 김소열. “北, 04년부터 中단둥서 사이버戰 활동.” Daily NK, 12 July 2009. Web. 
60 김도형. “北, IT인력 1500명 해외 보내 年 4000만달러 벌어.” DongA Ilbo, 25 August 2016. Web. 
61 There was a significant increase in 2004 when the number of centers expanded from 6 to 9: 
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which had been subordinate to the KCC and specialized in information security. North 
Korea has even pursued joint ventures with foreign entities; for example, the Nosotek 
(between the North Korean General Federation of Science and Technology and 
entrepreneurs from Germany) and Hana Electronics (between the North Korean Ministry 
of Culture and investors from the United Kingdom).63 
 Initial service for North Korea’s mobile network was established in November 
2002 under Loxley Pacific, the same company that later formed Star Joint Venture.64 
Before this, mobile communications had been limited to senior military and party 
officials. The 2G network provided service to around 20,000 subscribers until all mobile 
phone use was banned in 2004 following an alleged assassination against Kim Jong-il 
that used a remote-detonated explosive device. Service resumed in December 2008 under 
a company called Koryolink, a joint venture between North Korea’s Post and 
Telecommunications Corporation and Egypt’s Orascom Telecom Media and 
Technology.65 Although initially limited to voice service and short messaging service 
(SMS) and around 6,000 subscribers, the 3G network currently supports multimedia 
messaging service (MMS) and around 3 million subscribers, with the capacity to support 
up to 6 million. 
 The network is divided into two tiers, with local subscribers able to connect only 
to domestic numbers (tier one) and foreign subscribers able to connect only to 
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international numbers (tier two).66 Subscribers can contact numbers within the same tier 
but not those outside of it. As of February 2013, foreign subscribers have also been able 
to connect to the internet. In 2014, Koryolink provided access to a limited number of 
websites on Kwangmyong.67 In addition to the regular mobile network, there is a separate 
network that is reserved for the elites and that uses unique hardware and software to 
secure communications. This separate network (isolated from both local and foreign 
subscribers) was required because export restrictions prevented the incorporation of 
modern encryption technology. 
 For locals wanting to communicate with the outside world (for example, 
smugglers or those with defector family members in China or South Korea), Chinese 
mobile networks can be accessed along some of the border areas between North Korea 
and China.68 It has been reported, however, that the North Korean government has been 
jamming mobile signals to prevent this.69 
 In addition to the conventional networks, such as the internet, Kwangmyong, and 
mobile, there is a human network of illicit storage mediums that are smuggled into and 
out of North Korea. These storage mediums include CDs/DVDs, USB flash drives, and 
SD cards that are carried in person, dropped by balloon, or transported via drone. The 
content is usually news and entertainment media from South Korea that offers a rare 
glimpse of the outside world. Because personal computers are expensive and difficult to 
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acquire for many in North Korea, the content is accessed using a smartphone with a USB 
port or a device called a notel, a portable CD/DVD player that also includes a USB port 
and SD slot, as well as television and radio tuners. These low-cost and low-power 
devices, which are manufactured in China, were initially smuggled in and distributed 
illegally.70 However, demand and usage became so pervasive that the North Korean 
government capitulated and legalized the devices in 2015, although it did require all to be 
purchased at state-owned stores and registered with local government authorities. 
Television and radio tuners on the devices were also fixed to government stations. 
 
Military Cyber Resources and Operations 
 North Korea has made consistent and dramatic efforts to enhance its military 
cyber infrastructure. In 2014, it completed the installation of a dedicated high-speed 
fiber-optic military intranet referred to as Kumpyol (Gold Star) that allows for integrated 
command and control between strategic, operational, and tactical units.71 According to 
the most recent white paper from the Ministry of National Defense, North Korea has also 
doubled its cyberwarfare personnel over four years from an estimated 3,000 in 2012 to 
6,800 in 201672 and has conducted operations against South Korea to disrupt civilian and 
military activities and to target critical infrastructure.73 It is alleged that 1,100 of these 
personnel conduct covert cyberspace operations from locations abroad, which offer 
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increased internet capacity and increased operational anonymity.74 The personnel operate 
under the cover of legitimate North Korean IT firms abroad or joint ventures in China 
and Southeast Asia. 
 The Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) of the KPAF is responsible for 
intelligence and covert operations. It is comprised of six bureaus with compartmentalized 
functions, including operations, reconnaissance, cyber and technology, intelligence 
abroad, inter-Korean issues, and service support.75 Around 2009 and 2010, units 
associated with cyberspace operations that were scattered among the Korean Worker’s 
Party and the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces were consolidated under the RGB. 
North Korea has one confirmed and two suspected cyber units that are subordinate 
administratively to the RGB but that report directly to the National Defense 
Commission.76 These units are outlined in Figure 3.77 
 Bureau 121, the bureau for cyber and technology, is the most important and most 
infamous unit. It is responsible for both offensive and defensive cyberspace operations, 
including CNA, CND, and CNE, and has been implicated in multiple high-profile 
cyberspace operations against South Korea and the United States.78 
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Figure 3. Cyber Units under the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Units in grey are 
unconfirmed or suspected of having been merged or disbanded. 
 
 
Its alternative designation, the Cyber Warfare Guidance Bureau under the Electronic 
Reconnaissance Bureau, denotes that it is possibly overseen personally by Kim Jong-un, 
which is an indication of its strategic significance.79 According to a defector who studied 
with eventual operators for Bureau 121 at Kim Il Military University, 80 the unit is 
comprised of around 1,800 personnel and has teams inside and outside of North Korea.81 
 Mention of Unit 180 emerged in 2017 following a series of ransomware 
operations around the world. According to a defector, a former professor at Kim Il 
Military University, Unit 180 is responsible for cyberspace operations aimed at acquiring 
money for the regime, oftentimes by breaching the computers and networks of financial 
institutions and transferring money out of accounts.82 Although its position within the 
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structure of the RGB was not specified, the designation and mission most likely places it 
subordinate to Bureau 121. 
 Other suspected units under the RGB include the Computer Technology Research 
Lab and Lab 110. Although little information is available, it is possible that these units 
are responsible for the development of exploitation tools and techniques. It is also 
possible that Computer Technology Research Lab and Lab 110 have been merged with 
other units or disbanded.83 
 In addition to the RGB, there are two cyber units subordinate to the GSD of the 
KPA. These units are outlined in Figure 4.84 Although, again, little information is 
available, it is possible that the Operations Bureau is responsible for joint cyber mission 
coordination and integration, as well as the planning and disseminating of cyber strategy. 
According to a report from the Korean Institute for National Unification, the Command 
Automation Bureau conducts computer network operations (CNO) and is responsible for 
developing malware and searching for exploits.85 It has from 50 to 60 personnel and 
includes Unit 31 (malware development), Unit 32 (military software development), and 
Unit 56 (command and control software development). 
 Although the Enemy Collapse and Sabotage Bureau conducts operations in 
cyberspace, its mission is characterized as being more information warfare than 
cyberwarfare (CNA or CNE). It was also reported in 2016 that pursuant to a recent 
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restructuring, the GSD has added a Command Information Bureau and implemented an 
integrated tactical command and control system to enhance its command, control, 
communication, computer, and intelligence capabilities.86 
 
 
Figure 4. Cyber Units under the General Staff Department. Units in grey are assumed to 
have missions outside the scope of cyberwarfare. 
 
 
Cyber Strategy 
 Kim Jong-un once stated that “cyberwarfare is all-purpose sword that can 
guarantee ruthless strikes of the [Korea People’s Armed Forces] along with nuclear 
weapons and missiles.”87 North Korea’s cyberspace strategy reflects its overall offensive 
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posture and emphasis on asymmetrical and irregular warfare, with cyberspace operations 
considered “a low-cost, low-risk” means of targeting the vulnerabilities of other states 
that rely on cyberspace for civilian and military activities.88 Cyberspace operations offer 
North Korea the potential to damage or destroy the command, control, and 
communication networks of South Korea and the United States, neutralizing the benefits 
that these networks offer without the costs and risks associated with physical operations. 
North Korea also uses cyberspace to exploit the benefits of the treasure trove of open 
source scientific and technical intelligence that can be used to support domestic research 
and development efforts without the risk of defection or influence inherent with sending 
researchers abroad.89 
 Although the figures are varied, it is estimated that North Korea has spent 
between $1.1 billion and $3.2 billion overall on nuclear weapons development.90 This 
amount is far greater than the cost of training and equipping even 6,800 personnel to 
conduct cyberspace operations. There are also the high risks of escalation and loss 
inherent to physical operations. For example, on 23 November 2010, North Korea fired 
over a hundred artillery shells and rockets at Yeonpyeong Island in South Korea in 
response to a South Korean naval exercise. South Korea retaliated by shelling North 
Korean artillery positions. By the end of the conflict, there were 25 South Korean civilian 
and military casualties and at least 5 North Korean military casualties. 
                                                 
88 Jun, Jenny, Scott LaFoy, and Ethan Sohn. “North Korea’s Cyber Operations: Strategy and Responses.” 
Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015. Web. 
89 Mercado, Stephen. “Hermit Surfers of Pyongyang.” Studies in Intelligence 48.1 (2007): N.P. Web. 
90 Park, Ju-min and James Pearson. “North Korea Overcomes Poverty, Sanctions with Cut-Price Nukes.” 
Reuters, 11 January 2016. Web. 
42 
 Its cyberspace strategy also represents a means of financial income. North Korea 
has for decades engaged in illicit activities to finance the regime and to overcome 
economic sanctions. These activities have included the smuggling of goods, the 
manufacturing of drugs, and the counterfeiting of goods and currency.91 Often done under 
the guise of legitimate companies and the protection of diplomatic immunity, countries 
such as China, Malaysia, and Singapore have been referenced as nodes in the networks of 
illicit activities by North Korea.92 Increasing the enforcement of sanctions in these 
countries also increases the possibility that North Korea will turn to cybercrime to 
support itself. North Korea has in fact been implicated in the high-profile cybertheft of 
$81 million from the Bangladesh Bank in February 2016 and cyberextortion of around 
$55,000 through the ransomware operation WannaCry in May 2017.93 
 
Assessment of Cyberpower 
 Clark approaches cyberpower from a military perspective and defines it as the 
ability to conduct successful cyberwarfare. 94 Although the author identifies three factors 
that comprise cyberpower (cyber offense, cyber defense, and cyber dependence), the 
method for assigning the values is never made explicit. The assessment, which is 
depicted in Table 3, reveals that North Korea ranks as the highest for cyberpower (despite 
its low offensive ability) due to its high defensive ability and low dependence. 
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Table 3. Cyberpower and Ranking According to Clark. Nations are listed from highest to 
lowest. 
 
NATION OFFENSE DEFENSE DEPENDENCE TOTAL 
North Korea 2 9 7 18 
Russia 7 5 4 16 
China 5 4 6 15 
United States 8 2 1 11 
 
 
 Valeriano and Maness maintain the same approach as Clark but assign different 
values as depicted in Table 4. 95 In this alternate assessment, there is a notable difference 
in the value assigned to defensive ability for North Korea, with North Korea also ranking 
lowest for cyberpower. Although, again, the method for assigning values is not made 
explicit, these assessments do reveal the complicated nature of cyberspace and some of 
the factors that are relevant in evaluating cyberpower. 
 
Table 4. Cyberpower and Ranking According to Valeriano and Maness. Nations are listed 
from highest to lowest. 
 
NATION OFFENSE DEFENSE DEPENDENCE TOTAL 
Russia 7 8 3 18 
China 8 5 4 17 
United States 10 5 2 17 
North Korea 3 2 9 14 
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 The Australian Strategic Policy Institute approaches cyberpower from a 
development perspective, which it refers to as cyber maturity.96 It defines cyber maturity 
as the presence and operation of effective physical and institutional cyber infrastructure 
and identifies five categories. 
1. Governance: Ability and intent to address cyber issues through legislation and 
regulation domestically and to engage internationally. Includes the factors of 
(1a) organizational structure, (1b) legislation/regulation, and (1c) international 
engagement. 
 
2. Financial cybercrime enforcement: Capacity to address financial cybercrime. 
Includes the factor of (2) financial cybercrime. 
 
3. Military application: Capability and intent regarding the military use of 
cyberspace. Includes the factor of (3) military application. 
 
4. Digital economy and business: Understanding of the importance of 
cyberspace on economy and business. Includes the factors of (4a) engagement 
between government and business and (4b) digital economy. 
 
5. Social engagement: Public awareness of and engagement on cyber issues. 
Includes the factors of (5a) public awareness, (5b) fixed broadband 
penetration, and (5c) mobile broadband penetration. 
 
The cyber maturity rankings for China, North Korea, South Korea, and the United States 
are depicted in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Cyberpower and Ranking According to Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 
 
RANK NATION SCORE 
1 United States 88.1 
2 South Korea 83.6 
8 China 63 
22 North Korea 16.7 
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 Trusting these assessments, although North Korea does not have the same 
offensive cyber ability as the more powerful nations of the United States, Russia, and 
China and lags far behind in cyber development, it does have a considerable defensive 
cyber ability and negligible cyber dependence. This is due to its aforementioned isolation 
and almost absolute control over all forms of information technologies and 
communications (including computers, mobile phones, the internet, and all other 
networks). North Korea is able to easily and effectively sever its connection to 
cyberspace if threatened, and the operation of its infrastructure has little reliance on 
cyberspace.  
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CHAPTER V: ANALYSIS OF CYBERSPACE CAPABILITIES AND INTENT 
 
 In the DCIDD, from 2008 to 2011, Valeriano and Maness identified three North 
Korean cyberspace operations against the United States, ten against South Korea, and one 
against Japan. Of these, information on eight operations could not be found at the source 
cited or in any other source. These operations have therefore been excluded from the 
analysis. The authors also identified one South Korean cyberspace operation against 
North Korea in 2011. However, again, information was unable to be found, and this 
operation has been excluded. The resulting timelines cover all other cyberspace 
operations both by North Korea and against North Korea from July 2009 to February 
2017. 
There are a few notes regarding the timelines: 
• Dates provided indicate the month and year that an operation occurred or a 
series of operations ended for offensive cyberspace operations and the month 
and year that either was discovered for cyber exploitation or cyber espionage. 
 
• Events listed are those for which there was an analysis or investigation by 
credible authorities, such as government organizations or network security 
companies. 
 
• Technical details are omitted unless pertinent. 
 
• It is expected that sensitive information that possibly reveals sources and 
methods has been withheld by intelligence organizations. 
 
• In addition to the assessments unique to this thesis, operations from July 2009 
to April 2011 include the assessments from the DCIDD for reference only. 
Because the discrepancies are minor, any discussion is considered beyond the 
scope the thesis. 
 
• An ‘X’ in a table indicates that there is not enough information to assign a 
value for that factor. 
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 According to Valeriano and Maness, there is a tendency in the international 
system for ‘cyber hype’ (otherwise a form of ‘threat inflation’).97 Media headlines and 
articles often refer to CNA and CNE operations as a generalized “cyberattack” or “hack,” 
regardless of nuances in the technical sophistication of the threat actor, the target 
vulnerabilities, operational goals, and the degree to which any of this can be confirmed.98 
Many events or series of events are characterized as a sophisticated threat actor executing 
a successful “cyberattack” or “hack” against a vulnerable or fragile target. The danger of 
this is not only that perceptions of the threat and interactions in the international system 
will be misguided, but also that nations will waste human, financial, and technical 
resources in addressing the wrong threat and therefore remain vulnerable. 
 The threat from North Korea’s cyberspace operations has already been analyzed 
in regard to its resources and strategy. This can be thought of as its potential threat. The 
requirement now is a detailed analysis of the actual threat that cuts through the threat 
inflation. That is, how North Korea’s cyberspace resources and strategy are realized for 
use in operations and what effect this has on its targets. As noted by the Korea Economic 
Institute of America:99 
In cyberspace, many of the North Korean capabilities and intentions may be 
revealed only after a real attack takes place in the virtual domain, 
for which they will either claim responsibility or which will be undeniably traced 
back to the North Korean government or the non-state actors commissioned or 
controlled by [North Korea]. 
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Cyberspace Operations by North Korea 
 July 2009. A series of DDOS operations on July 4, July 7, and July 9 disrupted 
access to the websites of 27 financial institutions, government organizations, and media 
corporations in South Korea and the United States.100 According to Symantec, the 
computers used in the operations were infected with a piece of malware referred to as 
TROJAN.DOZER and propagated through email using varies worms.101 On July 10, a 
time bomb contained in the malware destroyed data in the MBR and partition table of the 
infected computers and overwrote the hard drive with the string “Memory of 
Independence Day”. Network security experts noted that the malware was relatively 
unsophisticated and that the operations were unable to generate enough requests for data 
to cause more than minor disruptions.102 The NIS reported that the operations were likely 
planned and executed by a specific group or state and an unconfirmed statement 
implicated North Korea.103 
 Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of 
a worm (4.3), had an effect on critical national infrastructure or military (2), was an 
individual cyber event that was offensive (3), targeted government military entities (3), 
and had the goal of disrupting target activity (1). The operation against the United States 
used the method of denial of service (2), had a minimal effect (1), was an individual 
cyber event that was a nuisance (1), targeted government non-military entities (2), and 
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had the goal of disrupting target activity (1). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end of 
the section, with the data from the DCIDD recreated in Table 7 for comparison. 
 
 January 2011. A DDOS operation in January 2011 disrupted access to the 
website of an internet forum in South Korea.104 The users of this internet forum had 
claimed responsibility for gaining access to the official Twitter and YouTube accounts of 
the North Korean government and posting derogatory comments and propaganda videos. 
This was done on January 8 to coincide with the Kim Jong-un’s birthday. It was 
suspected that the DDOS operation was retaliation by North Korea. 
 Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of 
a denial of service (2), had a minimal effect (1), was an individual cyber event that was a 
nuisance (1), targeted a private entity (1), and had the goal of disrupting target activity 
(1). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end of the section, with the data from the 
DCIDD recreated in Table 7 for comparison. 
 
 March 2011. A DDOS operation on March 4 disrupted access to the websites of 
40 financial institutions and government organizations in South Korea, as well to the 
websites of Kunsan Air Base and United States Forces Korea.105 According to Symantec, 
the computers used in the operation were infected with a piece of malware referred to as 
TROJAN.KOREDOS that was used for the DDOS operation and to destroy data in the 
master boot record, as well as a piece of malware referred to as BACKDOOR.PRIOXER 
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that was used to gain remote-access.106 BACKDOOR.PRIOXER was considered 
relatively sophisticated due to its discrete method of infection. However, it was uncertain 
if this was intentional. A report from McAfee noted that the sophistication for the 
encryption of the malware and command and control of the operation was excessive in 
comparison to the limited execution and effect of the attack, which was designed to last 
no more than ten days. 107 It was suspected that the operation was intended to test and 
observe the time required for the operation to be discovered, analyzed, and mitigated. 
 Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of 
a denial of service (2), had an effect on critical national infrastructure or military (2), was 
an individual cyber event that was a nuisance (1), targeted government non-military 
entities (2), and had the goal of disrupting target activity (1). The operation against the 
United States used the method of denial of service (2), had a minimal effect (1), was an 
individual cyber event that was a nuisance (1), targeted government military entities (3), 
and had the goal of disrupting target activity (1). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end 
of the section, with the data from the DCIDD recreated in Table 7 for comparison. 
 
 April 2011. An offensive cyberspace operation on April 12 destroyed system data 
and disrupted access to the internal network at Nonghyup Bank in South Korea, lasting 
three days and affecting 30 million customers.108 According to the results of an 
investigation by the Seoul Central District Prosecutor’s Office, backdoor malware was 
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introduced to the network in September 2010 via the infected laptop of a network security 
contractor, which was among 201 computers that had been infected during an 
undisclosed offensive cyberspace operation against financial institutions and government 
organizations in July 2009. The malware allowed the perpetrator to exfiltrate information 
(including internet protocols and system passwords) and install malicious code 
throughout the network over a period of several months. After the malicious code was 
installed, a remote deletion command was executed, destroying data on 273 of 587 
servers. The perpetrator then confirmed the success of the operation and destroyed 
evidence from both the laptop and the network. Due to the sophistication of the attack, it 
was suspected that considerable human, financial, and technical resources were required. 
The operation used malware that was similar to the July 2009 attack, as well as an IP 
address that was used for a command and control server from the same operation. Normal 
operations did not resume for a few weeks.109 
 Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of 
a virus (4.2), had a minimal effect (1), was an individual cyber event that was a nuisance 
(1), targeted private entities (1), and had the goal of disrupting target activity (1). This is 
summarized in Table 6 at the end of the section, with the data from the DCIDD recreated 
in Table 7 for comparison. 
 
 March 2013 (DarkSeoul/Operation Troy). An offensive cyberspace operation 
on March 20 destroyed data at three media corporations (MBC, KBS, and YTN) and 
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three financial institutions (Jeju Bank, Nonghyup Bank, Shinhan Bank) in South 
Korea.110 The operation used a piece of malware referred to as TROJAN.JOKRA that 
was used to gain remote-access and delete the MBR and content of any system or 
network hard drive.111 The initial infection occurred through a spearphishing email weeks 
before the operation and was further propagated via email and patch management.112 The 
operation occurred days after North Korea promised retribution for an alleged offensive 
cyberspace operation against it by the United States and South Korea. Normal operations 
resumed within a few hours. This operation has sometimes been referred to as DarkSeoul. 
 According to a report from McAfee, this operation was not an isolated event, but 
rather the culmination of a cyber espionage operation referred to as Operation Troy.113 
Operation Troy represented an APT that had specific targets only in South Korea. The 
various operations, which included at least those from July 2009, March 2011, and April 
2011, were likely intended to collect intelligence regarding the targets to prepare for 
future offensive cyberspace operations, such as the March 20 operation. Evidence for the 
suspected connection included similarities in the targets, as well as the TTPs of the 
operations. Operation Troy and subsequent operations suspected of being related to it 
have been attributed to a group later referred to as the DarkSeoul Gang, named after the 
malware and operation that brought it to light. 
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 Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of 
a worm (4.3) and was also an APT (5), had an effect on critical national infrastructure or 
military (2), was a series of cyber events that were a nuisance and offensive (5), targeted 
private entities (1), and had the goal of acquiring target information and data (2). This is 
summarized in Table 6 at the end of the section. 
 
 June 2013. A series of DDOS operations on June 25 (the anniversary of the start 
of the Korean War) disrupted access to the websites of government organizations in 
North Korea and South Korea. 114 The homepage of the Blue House in South Korea was 
also defaced with a message praising Kim Jong-un as the leader of a unified Korea. It 
was uncertain if both countries had attacked each other or if another actor had executed 
the attacks. However, a blog post by Symantec, attributed at least the operation on South 
Korea to the DarkSeoul Gang, noting several similarities in the targets and TTPs of this 
operation with those from July 2009, March 2011, and March 2013 as evidence:115 Eric 
Chien, a technical director with Symantec, suspected that the group behind the operation 
was comprised of between 10 and 50 members.116 
• Use of multistaged and coordinated operations against high-profile targets in 
South Korea 
 
• Use of destructive payloads, such as malicious code for hard drive wipes and 
DDOS operations, configured to trigger on significant dates 
 
• Overwriting hard drive sectors with strings that have political themes 
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• Use of patching mechanisms from legitimate third-parties to propagate across 
internal networks 
 
• Use of specific encryption and obfuscation methods 
 
• Use of webmail servers from specific third-parties to store files 
 
• Use of similar command and control structures 
 
An official from the Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning also noted that an 
analysis of the malicious code and affected systems revealed evidence of an IP address 
from North Korea, as well as similarities in the TTPs. 
 Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of 
denial of service (2), had a minimal effect (1), was an individual cyber event that was a 
nuisance (1), targeted government non-military entities (2), and had the goal of disrupting 
target activity (1). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end of the section. 
 
 September 2013 (Operation Kimsuky). Kaspersky Lab reported on 11 
September that it had uncovered a cyber espionage operation from at least April to 
monitor activity and exfiltration information from eleven entities in South Korea, 
including government organizations, private research institutes, and commercial defense 
firms.117 Notable targets were the Ministry of Unification, Korean Institute of Defense 
Analysis, and Hyundai Merchant Marine. The operation used a piece of malware called 
TROJAN.KIMSUKY that was likely propagated through a spearphishing email.118 The 
malware included a payload consisting of a keystroke logger and malicious code 
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designed to collect directory listings and ‘.hwp’ documents, as well as provide remote 
access. Along with targets limited to only South Korea, the report noted that there were 
Korean language characters in the malware and that the IP addresses associated with the 
operation originated in China near the border with North Korea. This operation has been 
characterized as an APT and referred to Operation Kimsuky.119 
 Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of 
a keystroke logger (4.5) and was also an APT (5), had a minimal effect (1), was an 
individual cyber event that was a nuisance (1), targeted government non-military entities 
(2), and had the goal of acquiring target information and data (2). This is summarized in 
Table 6 at the end of the section. 
 
 August 2014. According to a statement from a national assembly member from 
the Land, Infrastructure, and Transportation Committee made on 5 October 2015, citing 
the results of a report from the NIS, North Korea was suspected of conducting a cyber 
espionage operation against the Seoul Metro from at least March to August 2014 that 
exfiltrated information.120 It was confirmed in the report that two servers in charge of 
program installation and patch management had been breached, allowing unauthorized 
access to at least 213 computers, of which 58 had been infected with malicious code.121 
The Seoul Metro discovered the breach in July, after which it shut down the servers and 
notified government authorities. The operation exfiltrated several documents but did not 
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gain access to central computers or networks with direct operational control over the 
metro system. Due to the absence of a log management system, the NIS was able to 
secure logs from no earlier than March. Although it was unable to determine the date or 
method of initial infiltration, it was suspected to have been before March. This operation 
was characterized as an APT. 
 Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of 
intrusion (3) and was also an APT (5), had a minimal effect (1), was an individual cyber 
event that was a nuisance (1), targeted a private entity (1), and had the goal of acquiring 
target information and data (2). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end of the section. 
 
 November 2014. An offensive cyberspace operation on 24 November against 
Sony Pictures Entertainment in the United States disrupted computer and network access, 
exfiltrated sensitive information, and destroyed data on 3,262 of its 6,797 computers and 
837 of its 1,555 servers.122 The operation used a worm that functioned as a dropper to 
deliver a payload of an additional five pieces of malware to include a listener, backdoors, 
and wipers.123 The group that claimed to be responsible called itself the Guardians of 
Peace and stated that it had conducted the operation response to the planned release of 
The Interview, a comedy movie that depicts the assassination of the supreme leader of 
North Korea. The group released some of the sensitive information, which included 
embarrassing correspondence and confidential personal information of employees, and 
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also threatened the release of additional information if the movie was released. 124 The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conducted an investigation and concluded that 
North Korea was responsible for the attack. This conclusion was based on several pieces 
of evidence: 
• Technical aspects of the malicious code used were similar to malicious code 
confirmed to have been developed by North Korea. 
 
• The source of the operation was traced to several IP addresses associated with 
North Korean entities in China. 
 
• The means and methods of the infiltration were similar to those used against 
South Korea in March 2013.125 
 
 Some doubted the attribution of the operation to North Korea, noting that Sony 
Pictures Entertainment was notorious for its poor network security and was the victim of 
24 previous documented incidents.126 However, Director of the FBI James Comey stated 
that “I have very high confidence about this attribution, as does the entire intelligence 
community.”127 
 Based on this information, the operation against the United States used the 
method of a worm (4.3), had a minimal effect (1), was an individual cyber event that was 
a nuisance (1), targeted a private entity (1), and had the goal of disrupting target activity 
(1). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end of the section. 
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 December 2014. Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power, a subsidiary of the state-
owned Korea Electric Power Corporation in South Korea, reported on 22 December that 
a cyber espionage operation exfiltrated sensitive information from the Gori and 
Wolseong nuclear power plants, including confidential personal information of 
employees, designs and manuals for at least two reactors, and estimates of radiation 
exposure among local residents. A user on Twitter who alleged to be from antinuclear 
group in Hawaii claimed responsibility for the operation and released some of the 
information. The user also threatened to release additional information if three of the 
reactors were not shut down by 25 December. After the reactors were not shut down, the 
user did release additional information and then demanded money, claiming that other 
countries had offered to purchase the designs and manuals for the reactors. The results of 
an investigation by the Seoul Central District Prosecutor’s Office implicated North Korea 
in the operation after discovering that the malware used was similar in composition and 
function to TROJAN.KIMSUKY and tracing the IP addresses associated with the 
operation to a city in China near the border with North Korea.128 
 Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of 
intrusion (3), had a minimal effect (1), was an individual cyber event that was a nuisance 
(1), targeted a government non-military entity (2), and had the goal of acquiring target 
information and data (1). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end of the section. 
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 October 2015. The NIS reported on 20 October that throughout September and 
October, a cyber espionage operation had exfiltrated government audit information from 
the National Assembly and had also targeted the Blue House, Ministry of National 
Defense, and Ministry of Unification.129 The computers of three national assembly 
members and eleven aides. The operation was attributed to North Korea, noting 
similarities in the targets from previous operations. 
 Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of 
intrusion (3), had a minimal effect (1), was an individual cyber event that was a nuisance 
(1), targeted a government non-military entity (2), and had the goal of acquiring target 
information and data (2). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end of the section. 
 
 February 2016. The National Police Agency reported that a cyber espionage 
operation by North Korea had infiltrated 140,000 computers at 160 government 
organizations.130 The operation, which started around 20 months earlier in 2014 and was 
discovered in February 2016, exfiltrated 42,000 documents, including 40,000 defense-
related documents regarding research and development and manufacturing.131 According 
to the report, the operators breached a software management system used by commercial 
firms to install, delete, and update software on all devices connected to the network.132 
This allowed malicious code that exfiltrated information to be installed. An IP addressed 
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used in the operation was traced to North Korea and was identical to an address used in 
the March 2016 offensive cyberspace operation. Authorities suspected that the operation 
was possibly preparation for a future offensive cyberspace operation.133 
 Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of 
intrusion (3) and was also an APT (5), had an effect on critical national infrastructure or 
military (2), was a series of cyber events that were a nuisance (1), targeted government 
(non-military and military) entities (6), and had the goal of acquiring target information 
and data (2). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end of the section. 
 
 March 2016. The NIS reported on 7 March that North Korea was suspected in a 
series of cyberspace operations in South Korea, including one successful cyber espionage 
operation, two successful cyber exploitation operations, and one attempted operation.134 
The cyber espionage operation targeted and exfiltrated information from tens of senior 
government officials at 14 government organizations via phishing text messages that 
were sent to smartphones from February to March.135 The text messages directed users to 
domains that downloaded and installed malicious code that granted remote-access to 
mobile devices. From those infected, operators were able to exfiltrate voice 
communications and text messages, as well as contact information. The cyber 
exploitation operations were both discovered in February.136 The first breached the 
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internal network of a security software firm that provided protection for internet financial 
services and card transactions for millions of users. The second digital certificate of a 
firm that also provided security software for internet financial services. 
 The NIS also reported that spearphishing emails were sent to the email accounts 
of railway employees at two regional operators from January to February. 137 The targeted 
accounts were closed as soon as the phishing emails were reported. It was suspected yet 
unconfirmed that the operation was an attempt to access the railway transport control 
system. Although specific evidence was not provided, the NIS claimed that North Korea 
was behind all the operations, which was possibly preparation for a future offensive 
cyberspace operation. 
 Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of 
intrusion (3), had a minimal effect (1), was a series of cyber events that were a nuisance 
(1), targeted private and government non-military entities (4), and had the goal of 
acquiring target information and data (2). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end of the 
section. 
 
 September 2016. A national assembly member from the National Defense 
Committee announced on 1 October that in September, malicious code from a cyber 
exploitation operation had been found on a server at the Cyber Command of the Ministry 
of National Defense (MND).138 A subsequent report from the MND in December 
confirmed that the operation breached a routing sever and infected 3,200 computers with 
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malicious code, including 700 computers that were connected to the intranet.139 Although 
the server was isolated to prevent further infection, the intranet was breached and 
sensitive defense-related documents exfiltrated.140 The source of the operation was traced 
to several IP addresses in China associated with North Korea. 
 Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of 
intrusion (3), had an effect on critical national infrastructure or military (1), was an 
individual cyber event that was a nuisance (1), targeted a government military entity (3), 
and had the goal of acquiring target information and data (2). This is summarized in 
Table 6 at the end of the section. 
 
 February 2017 (WannaCry). A cyber ransom operation emerged in February 
that targeted 104 organizations in 31 countries around the world and used ransomware to 
extort money from victims.141 Reports from Kaspersky Lab and Symantec claimed that a 
group referred to as the Lazarus Group, with which North Korea is suspected of being 
associated, was behind the operation. The ransomware and the operation are oftentimes 
referred to as WannaCry. Based on an assessment that was not made public, the NSA had 
“moderate confidence” that the threat actor behind two versions of WannaCry, the 
Lazarus Group, were sponsored by the RGB.142 Both the NSA and FBI also implicated 
North Korea in a similar operation involving the high-profile cyber theft of over $81 
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million from the account of the Bangladesh Bank at the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York in February 2016.143 
 According to Kaspersky Lab, the Lazarus Group started operations from at least 
2009 and developed the malicious code used for the cyberspace operations in March 
2013 and November 2014.144 It was also associated with the development of a backdoor 
referred to as HANGMAN that was discovered in September 2015. HANGMAN used a 
zero-day exploit in ‘.hwp’ documents145 and contained code that connected to an IP 
address for a command and control server used in a variant of a backdoor referred to as 
MACKTRUCK. The code for HANGMAN was also similar to a backdoor called 
PEACHPIT. Both MACKTRUCK and PEACHPIT are associated with cyberspace 
operations by North Korea.146 In addition, the report identified the possible existence of a 
unit within the Lazarus Group, referred to as Bluenoroff, that uses backdoors established 
through operations by the Lazarus Group for financial gain. Bluenoroff has targeted four 
types of organizations in nine countries. These have included (1) financial institutions, (2) 
casinos, (3) companies involved in the development of financial trade software, and (4) 
businesses associated with cryptocurrency. 
 According to Symantec, an initial variant of the ransomware that included as 
payload two pieces of malware from previous cyberspace operations appeared on 10 
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February. 147 BACKDOOR.DESTOVER was used in the offensive cyberspace operation 
against Sony Pictures Entertainment in November 2014, and TROJAN.VOLGMER was 
used in the cyber espionage operation against South Korea in June 2013. At least one 
organization in February and five organizations from March to April were infected with 
this variant of the ransomware. The malicious code was propagated within networks 
using stolen credentials. On 12 May, the operation expanded as a new variant of the 
ransomware appeared that incorporated a zero-day exploit.148 This exploit allowed the 
ransomware to propagate at a much faster rate by eliminating the need to steal 
credentials. Similarities in TTPs, including shared network infrastructure and shared 
malicious code, were cited as evidence connecting this operation to others by the Lazarus 
Group.149 
 The reports from Kaspersky Lab and Symantec represented a coordinated 
industry-wide effort, called Operation Blockbuster and announced on 24 February 2016, 
to share intelligence and resources and assist commercial and government organizations 
in protecting against the Lazarus Group.150 There were several conclusions made based 
on this effort:151 
• The scale and sophistication of the operations is beyond that of criminal 
organizations and even beyond that of other APT groups. 
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• The human, financial, and technological resources required for this, as well as 
the operational errors, indicate that the Lazarus Group is comprised of several 
units. 
 
• The Lazarus Group has been prolific in the development of malware, avoiding 
reuse and releasing newer and newer versions. 
 
 Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of 
a worm (4.3) and was also an APT (5), had an effect on critical national infrastructure or 
military (2), and targeted private and government non-military entities. However, the 
interaction type and goal type are difficult to assess with this methodology because the 
series of events were not part of a cyberspace operation but rather part of a cybercrime. 
The assessment is included here because although the cybercrime is normally outside the 
scope of activities for a government, North Korea is an exception. This is summarized in 
Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Assessment of Cyberspace Operations by North Korea. 
 
DATE NATION METHOD SEVERITY INTERACTION TARGET GOAL 
07/2009 
South 
Korea 
4.3 2 3 3 1 
United 
States 
2 1 1 2 1 
01/2011 
South 
Korea 
2 1 1 1 1 
03/2011 
South 
Korea 
2 2 1 2 1 
United 
States 
2 1 1 3 1 
04/2011 
South 
Korea 
4.2 1 1 1 1 
03/2013 
South 
Korea 
4.3 (5) 2 5 1 2 
06/2013 
South 
Korea 
2 1 1 2 1 
09/2013 
South 
Korea 
4.5 (5) 1 1 2 2 
08/2014 
South 
Korea 
3 (5) 1 1 1 2 
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11/2014 
United 
States 
4.3 1 1 1 1 
12/2014 
South 
Korea 
3 1 1 2 1 
10/2015 
South 
Korea 
3 1 1 2 2 
02/2016 
South 
Korea 
3 (5) 2 1 6 2 
03/2016 
South 
Korea 
3 1 1 4 2 
09/2016 
South 
Korea 
3 2 1 3 2 
02/2017 
South 
Korea 
4.3 (5) 2 X 4 X 
 
 
Table 7. Valeriano and Maness Assessment of Cyberspace Operations by North Korea. 
 
DATE NATION METHOD SEVERITY INTERACTION TARGET GOAL 
07/2009 
South 
Korea 
4.2 2 3 2 0 
United 
States 
2 1 1 2 0 
01/2011 
South 
Korea 
1 1 1 2 0 
03/2011 
South 
Korea 
2 1 1 1 0 
United 
States 
2 1 1 2 0 
04/2011 
South 
Korea 
4.2 1 1 1 0 
 
 
Cyberspace Operations against North Korea 
 December 2014. An offensive cyberspace operation against North Korea’s 
internet affected access for several days.152 Disruption started on 19 December and 
resulted in complete denial on 22 December, with access restored after ten hours. The 
operation occurred only hours after President Barak Obama promised a proportional 
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response to the offensive cyberspace operation against Sony Pictures Entertainment on 24 
November that the FBI attributed to North Korea. The United States government denied 
any involvement in the operation. North Korea responded by threating its “toughest 
counteraction […] by far surpassing the ‘symmetric counteraction’ declared by 
Obama”.153 There were initial suspicions that the event was benign and due to North 
Korea itself or even to China, but experts claimed that the event was inconsistent with 
activities such as maintenance or repair.154 Because the bandwidth for North Korea is so 
low, even a small amount of traffic can overload its internet connection. The event was, 
however, consistent with a DDOS operation. 
 Based on this information, the operation against North Korea used the method of 
a denial of service (2), had a minimal effect due to low dependence on the internet (1), 
was an individual cyberspace operation that was a nuisance (1), and had the goal of 
disrupting target activity (1). As the distinction between private and government in North 
Korea is nonexistent and the operation targeted the entire internet, the target is difficult to 
assess with this methodology. This is summarized in Table 8 at the end of the section. 
 
 May 2015. A report from Reuters claimed that the United States had attempted an 
offensive cyberspace operation against North Korea’s nuclear weapon development 
program between 2009 and 2010, but was unsuccessful.155 According to the report, the 
operation was conducted in tandem with an operation against Iran, referred to as Olympic 
                                                 
153 Kang, Cecilia, Drew Harwell and Brian Fung. “North Korean Web Goes Dark Days after Obama 
Pledges Response to Sony Hack.” The Washington Post, 22 December 2014. Web. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Menn, Joseph. “US Tried Stuxnet-Style Campaign against North Korea but Failed – Sources.” Reuters, 
29 May 2015. Web. 
68 
Games, which also targeted its nuclear weapon development program. Olympic Games 
used a now infamous piece of malware called Stuxnet that degraded the operation of the 
centrifuges used by Iran for uranium enrichment. Among other functions, it damaged or 
destroyed the centrifuges by directing the programmable logic controllers to spin beyond 
tolerances. Experts speculated that the operation required an unprecedented amount of 
human, financial, and technical resources to plan, develop, and execute. Stuxnet is 
considered the only confirmed use of malware by a state actor to cause physical damage 
against an adversary. 
 As North Korea and Iran acquired centrifuges from the same source and 
cooperated on nuclear weapon development activities, it is likely that the programmable 
logic controllers were similar. Therefore, it is also likely that the operation against North 
Korea used a variant of Stuxnet. However, there are a few possible reasons that it seems 
to not have made an impact on the pace of development. First, the malware might not 
have been able to access the systems and networks, which were not connected to the 
internet. North Korea has less interaction with foreigners than Iran and thus fewer 
opportunities to introduce the malware. There is also less intelligence available about its 
development facilities. Second, even if the malware was introduced, North Korea also 
uses plutonium, which does not require enrichment. 
 Based on this information, the operation against North Korea attempted to use the 
method of a worm, a variant of Stuxnet, (4.3) that was an APT (5), was an individual 
cyberspace operation that was offensive (3), targeted a government military entity (3), 
and had the goal of disrupting target activity (1). As the operation was unsuccessful, the 
severity is not applicable. This is summarized in Table 8 at the end of the section. 
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 March 2017. An article from the New York Times reported that from 2014, the 
United States had conducted offensive cyberspace operations against North Korea’s 
ballistic missile program as an alternative to reliance on ballistic missile defense 
systems.156 According to the article, the high failure rates during flight tests of 
interceptors indicated that these systems were unable to meet the goal of defending the 
United States against ballistic missile threats. Statements from officials advocated for the 
preemptive use of non-kinetic capabilities, such as cyber and electronic capabilities. 
Then, soon after the test detonation of a nuclear device in February 2013 by North Korea, 
the United States published Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Vision 2020, which 
referenced using “cyberwarfare, directed energy, and electronic attack” capabilities and 
“neutralizing an adversary’s offensive air and missile assets prior to use.”157 Throughout 
2014 and 2016, the failure rates during flight tests of various ballistic missile systems 
were noticeably high.158 All this was cited as evidence for the presence of covert 
cyberspace operations. 
 Others, however, argued that even if the United States had the capability, 
correlation did not equal causation.159 It was noted that the failures since 2014 were 
limited to four new missile systems that had never been tested, the BM-25 (five failures), 
the KN-011 (three failures), an unidentified intercontinental ballistic missile (two 
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failures), and an unidentified anti-ship missile (two failures).160 Drawing conclusions 
from failure rates is difficult because of the numerous factors that must be considered. It 
is possible that the failures were simply the result of a rushed program and limited 
resources. 
 Based on this information and assuming the operation did occur, the operation 
against North Korea, had an effect on critical national infrastructure of military (2), was 
an individual cyberspace operation that was offensive (3), targeted a government military 
entity (3), and had the goal of disrupting target activity (1). There is not enough 
information to assess the method used in the operation. This is summarized in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Assessment of Cyberspace Operations against North Korea. 
 
DATE NATION METHOD SEVERITY INTERACTION TARGET GOAL 
12/2014 
North 
Korea 
2 1 1 X 1 
05/2015 
North 
Korea 
4.3 (5) X 3 3 1 
03/2017 
North 
Korea 
X 2 3 3 1 
 
 
Assessment of Cyberspace Capabilities 
 The initial period of North Korean cyberspace operations from July 2009 to April 
2011 was characterized primarily by offensive cyberspace operations (almost all of which 
were DDOS operations) of varying scope and severity. There is evidence that these 
operations required no more than months by tens of personnel to plan and execute and no 
more than a medium level of knowledge or access. In fact, DDOS operations often use 
                                                 
160 Ibid. 
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botnets of infected computers, which do not necessarily require a high level of 
commitment or resources to establish. However, by April 2011, the suspected level of 
resources that were required had increased relative to previous operations. Because 
targets included up to military government entities in South Korea and the United States, 
it is assumed that the threat actor was willing accept a high level of associated risk. It was 
also able to mostly but not entirely obscure the details of its operations. Although 
attempts were made at wiping hard drives, traces of malware were left behind in all 
operation Based on these factors, North Korea is assessed at an initial threat level of five 
according to OTA as of April 2011, which is summarized in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. North Korean Threat Profile as of April 2011 
 
THREAT 
LEVEL 
THREAT PROFILE 
Commitment Attributes Resource Attributes 
Intensity Stealth Time 
Technical 
Personnel 
Cyber 
Knowledge 
Kinetic 
Knowledge 
Access 
5 H M Weeks/Months Tens M M M 
 
 
 The latest period of North Korean cyberspace operations, those from March 2013 
to May 2017,161 has been characterized primarily by cyber espionage. It was from this 
period that North Korea began to be considered an APT by experts. The operations had 
specific targets associated with the government and critical national infrastructure, used 
TTPs that indicated a high degree of organization and high amount of resources, and 
                                                 
161 This end date represents the final semester during which research for this thesis was conducted, not any 
significant change in North Korean cyberspace operations. 
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required extended operations and repeated attempts. Analysis and investigation from 
almost every subsequent operation has revealed a greater scope and greater intensity of 
operations, often requiring tens of tens or even hundreds of personnel and months to 
years to plan, develop, and execute. Although there is indication of a high level of cyber 
knowledge due to evidence of the internal development and use of sophisticated pieces of 
malware (two of which each even incorporated a zero-day exploit) there is no indication 
of more than a medium level of kinetic knowledge or access. Based on these factors, 
North Korea is assessed at a latest threat level of three according to OTA as of May 2017, 
which is summarized in Table 10. 
 
Table 10. North Korean Threat Profile as of May 2017 
 
THREAT 
LEVEL 
THREAT PROFILE 
Commitment Attributes Resource Attributes 
Intensity Stealth Time 
Technical 
Personnel 
Cyber 
Knowledge 
Kinetic 
Knowledge 
Access 
3 H H Months/Years Tens/Tens H M M 
 
 
 In addition to the attributes discussed, OTA also considers the multipliers of 
funding, assets, and technology, which potentially enhance capabilities but do not 
necessarily increase the threat level. This is because the multipliers can either increase or 
decrease certain measures. In the case of North Korea, although the increased amount of 
funding and number of assets evidenced by the analysis of offensive cyberspace 
operations have provided an increased level of technical personnel and cyber knowledge, 
these multipliers also have increased the reliance on resources abroad. This has resulted 
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in an increased degree of exposure and therefore a decreased level of stealth. In contrast, 
the increased sophistication of technology has resulted in an increased level of access.  
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION 
 
Results 
 In regard to Hypothesis 1, North Korea’s cyberspace resources and capabilities 
have increased and have now reached a level that represents an advanced persistent 
threat. Its development of civilian cyberspace resources has been cautious yet consistent. 
Efforts began in 1990 under the KCC, which has continued and expanded its efforts to 
include research and development at nine centers and providing IT services abroad from 
offices in China, Japan, and Europe. North Korea now also operates three state-owned IT 
ventures and several IT firms. 
 In 2000, cyberspace in North Korea consisted only of a domestic intranet. By 
2002, North Korea had established a mobile network and by 2003, had established an 
internet connection. Although little information is available on the latter, the former has 
been ungraded from 2G to 3G and expanded from 20,000 to 3 million subscribers. All 
this, however, has been accompanied by the development and implementation of 
domestic software that provides the government with an unprecedented degree of 
monitoring and control. 
 In addition, North Korea’s development of military capabilities in cyberspace has 
been consistent and dramatic. In 2014, it completed the installation of a dedicated high-
speed fiber-optic military intranet that allows for integrated command and control 
between strategic, operational, and tactical units. It has one confirmed and two suspected 
cyber units subordinate to the RGB and two cyber units subordinate to the GSD. North 
Korea has also doubled its cyberwarfare personnel from an estimated 3,000 in 2012 to 
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6,800 in 2016.162 There are reports that it has 1,200 personnel at covert cyber units in 
China and Southeast Asia.163 North Korean cyber units have been implicated in several 
high-profile operations, such as the July 2009 DDOS operation, the November 2014 
operation against Sony Pictures Entertainment, and WannaCry. Based on a correlation 
between the TTPs of North Korean cyberspace operations and these confirmed and 
suspected cyber units, it is possible that the Lazarus Group (which was previously and/or 
is alternatively referred to as the DarkSeoul Gang) is actually Bureau 121 and Bluenoroff 
is actually the subordinate Unit 180. 
 North Korea possesses a large spectrum of methods used for cyberspace 
operations, including the tools of botnets, trojans, viruses, and worms. At least 4 out of 15 
operations were targeted and sophisticated enough for the threat actor to be considered an 
APT. Regarding the tools, a recent joint technical alert from the FBI and DHS in fact 
identified a massive botnet infrastructure that is maintained by North Korea and referred 
to as DeltaCharlie.164 The report, which refers to North Korean malicious cyberspace 
activity as HIDDEN COBRA, confirms that the “tools and capabilities used by HIDDEN 
COBRA actors include DDOS botnets, keyloggers, remote access tools (RATs), and 
wiper malware.”165 
 In light of its overall operations, North Korea’s capabilities can be thought of as 
representing a high-level threat according to OTA.166 This places it alongside threats such 
                                                 
162 By comparison, the United States planned to have 6,000 personnel at its Cyber Command as of 2016 
163 Cordesman, Anthony. “Korean Special, Asymmetric, and Paramilitary Forces.” Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9 August 2016. Web. 
164 Department of Homeland Security, US-CERT. HIDDEN COBRA – North Korea’s DDoS Botnet 
Infrastructure, 13 June 2017. Web. 
165 Ibid. 
166 A high-level threat corresponds to levels 1-3, medium-level to levels 4-6, and low-level to levels 7-8. 
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as those represented by the series of offensive cyberspace operations against the Estonian 
internet in 2007. There is no evidence, however, that it has acquired the resources (the 
attributes of cyber knowledge, kinetic knowledge, and access) required for an operation 
such as that against the Iranian uranium enrichment program in 2009 and 2010. Such an 
operation can be assigned a threat level of one, which represents the greatest form of 
APT. 
 In regard to Hypothesis 2, despite the increase in cyberspace resources and 
capabilities, North Korea’s cyberspace operations have remained restrained (produced 
minimal effects on South Korean and United States national security) and regional 
(targeted South Korea over the United States). The types of North Korean cyberspace 
operations are almost equal in occurrence. Out of 15 operations, 7 were offensive 
cyberspace operations and 8 were cyber espionage. Out of 3 operations against the United 
States in particular, all were offensive cyberspace operations and none were cyber 
espionage. It is also interesting to note that no offensive cyberspace operation has been 
conducted against South Korea since June 2013 or against the United States since 
November 2014. Although there have been subsequent cyber espionage operations 
against South Korea, there have no subsequent cyberspace operations against the United 
States. 
 There are a few possible explanations for this seeming transition from a period of 
offensive cyberspace operations to a period of cyber espionage against South Korea. As 
mentioned earlier, cyber espionage is often preparation for an offensive cyberspace 
operation. Therefore, it is possible that South Korea has improved at discovering this 
before the offensive cyberspace operation is executed. This was the suspicion after the 
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operation in February 2016 was uncovered. It is also possible that the period of offensive 
cyberspace operation was for the testing of capabilities that were to be used for the 
eventual and current period of cyber espionage. This is similar to the suspicion that the 
operation in March 2011 was for the testing of capabilities and observing of the time 
required for the operation to be discovered, analyzed, and mitigated. 
 The frequency of North Korean cyberspace operations increased in 2011, with 
two to three operations conducted or discovered each year since then except for 2012. 
Although any connection is speculation, 2012 was the year that Kim Jong-un assumed the 
position of supreme leader after his father, Kim Jong-il, died in December 2011. During 
this transition, the attention of the leadership was on reestablishing legitimacy and 
refocusing power from the military to the ruling party.167 
 The effects of North Korea’s offensive cyberspace operations and cyber 
espionage operations on South Korea and United States national security have been 
minimal. The intensity of North Korean cyberspace operations has never exceeded that of 
an effect on critical national infrastructure or military and most have been below this, 
with 10 of out 17 operations at the intensity of minimal effect. The intensity of operations 
against the United States in particular has never exceeded that of a minimal effect. 
 From the framework of risk, the consequences of these operations can be difficult 
to determine and measure. There are likely psychological consequences for most 
operations. However, the research on the psychological consequences in relation to cyber 
terrorism is limited, and it is unclear whether these cyber incidents can even be 
                                                 
167 Lee, Hong-yung. “North Korea in 2012: Kim Jong-Un’s Succession.” Asian Survey 53.1 (2013): 176-
183. Web. 
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characterized as cyber terrorism.168 The operational and resultant economic consequences 
are easier to measure. During the multiple DDOS operations by North Korea, government 
and civilian entities were unable to provide services via the internet for hours or 
sometimes even days. This resulted in operating losses, as well as investigation and 
remediation costs. The MND estimated that North Korean offensive cyberspace 
operations between 2009 and 2013 had cost $805 million.169 Sony Pictures Entertainment 
reported that the offensive cyberspace operation in September 2014 had cost $15 million. 
Although these figures seem high, the actual economic consequences are low in 
comparison to overall national or corporate budgets.170 
 The focus of North Korean cyberspace operations is overwhelmingly on South 
Korea. 12 out of 17 operations have focused on South Korea exclusively, and only 1 out 
of 17 operations has focused on the United States exclusively. However, this single event 
in November 2014 was instigated by the planned release of a comedy movie by the 
United States that offended North Korea. Dissimilar from previous operations against 
both South Korea the United States, there was a single target that was unassociated with 
the government or military, an articulated personal motive, and a demand to cancel the 
release of the movie. This operation was uncharacteristic of most operations by state 
actors. 
 In regard to Hypothesis 3, North Korea’s valuable assets include its ability to 
control cyberspace within North Korea and its ability to engage in cyberspace activities 
                                                 
168 Gross, Michael, Daphna Canetti, and Dana Vashdi. “The Psychological Effects of Cyber Terrorism.” 
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72.5 (2016): 284-291. Web. 
169 “정희수 ‘북한 사이버 공격으로 8천 600억원 피해’.” Yonhap News, 15 October 2013. Web. 
170 Hackett, Robert. “How Much Do Data Breaches Cost Big Companies? Shockingly Little.” Fortune, 27 
March 2015. Web. 
79 
and operations from abroad. The North Korean government has implemented extreme 
measures to ensure control over the flow of information into and within the nation. It has 
developed intrusive software (or malware in any context other than the North Korean 
government) that monitors and controls activities on almost all devices, systems, and 
networks used by its citizens. Although access to these has been increasing, it is still 
restricted. 
 Although cyberspace infrastructure in North Korea has been developing, greater 
capacity and greater anonymity is offered by locations abroad. A reported 1,100 out of 
6,800 cyberwarfare personnel conduct operations from covert locations abroad. 171 It has 
also been reported that 1,000 personnel from the KCC have been sent abroad to earn 
money for the regime. 172 As these KCC personnel represent a broad range of IT 
experience and expertise and the North Korean government has been implicated in illicit 
activities before, it is likely that this earning of money is not entirely benign. As with its 
military cyberspace operations existing within an overall national security strategy, this 
emphasis on moving activities abroad exists within an economic strategy to circumvent 
debilitating sanctions. It is possible that this was the motivation behind the alleged high-
profile cybertheft of $81 million from the Bangladesh Bank in February 2016 and 
cyberextortion of around $55,000 through the ransomware operation WannaCry in May 
2017. 
                                                 
171 김봉기. “‘北, 최근 청와대·국회 해킹 시도… 국감 자료 빼내가’.” Chosun Ilbo, 21 October 2015. 
Web. 
172 김도형. “北, IT인력 1500명 해외 보내 年 4000만달러 벌어.” DongA Ilbo, 25 August 2016. Web. 
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 The incident involving WannaCry in particular highlights another danger posed 
by North Korean cyberspace activities in general. There was some speculation that 
because this operation was so uncharacteristic of a state actor or even other operations 
attributed to North Korea, it was possibly the act of a non-state actor that was simply 
associated with or supported by North Korea.173 This introduces the potential for the 
proliferation of cyber weapons, either intentionally for financial gain or unintentionally 
through the traces of malware and malicious code left behind after an operation. In fact, a 
comprehensive report from Hewlett Packard emphasizes the potential for such 
proliferation of cyber weapons in light of the past proliferation of kinetic weapon 
expertise by North Korea and the current relationships with Russia, China, Iran, and Syria 
that involve cyberspace.174 For example, North Korea has relied on China for IT 
resources and Russia for cyber training and concluded agreement with Iran in 2012 to 
combat “common enemies” in cyberspace and a similar agreement with Syria in 2002.175 
 On another note, as revealed through the analysis, the characterization of 
operations as being “sophisticated” or even a “cyberattack” or a “hack” is often 
misleading. At least one of the targets, Sony Pictures Entertainment, had notoriously poor 
network security.176 Two of the incidents simply involved attempts at phishing text 
messages or emails, most of which were unsuccessful. It is also important to remember 
                                                 
173 Elias, Groll. “Security Firms Tie WannaCry Ransomware to North Korea.” Foreign Policy, 23 May 
2017. Web. 
174 Hewlett Packard Security Research. Profiling an Enigma: The Mystery of North Korea’s Cyber Threat 
Landscape, August 2014. Web. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Steinberg, Joseph. “Massive Security Breach at Sony – Here's What You Need to Know.” Forbes, 11 
December 2014. Web. 
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that sophistication is relative to a particular time. Something that was sophisticated 
several years ago is not necessarily sophisticated now. 
 
Counterarguments 
 There are two main competing arguments regarding the implications of malicious 
cyberspace activity. The first argument claims that it represents a nuisance that will 
unlikely escalate to an existential threat to national security (cyber threat inflation 
theory). The second argument claims that it represents a threat to national security that 
will possibly result in serious damage or destruction (cyber threat theory). This thesis 
generally supports the former. 
 That is, although there is little indication of any counterargument by experts that 
North Korean cyberspace capabilities have not increased, there is a counterargument that 
North Korean cyberspace operations will possibly result in serious damage or destruction 
for South Korea and United States. However, this counterargument is unsubstantiated. As 
demonstrated by the analysis, North Korean cyberspace operations have been restrained, 
never having effects on national security strategy and never having physical 
consequences. Even if North Korea does have the capabilities for such escalated 
cyberspace operations (and there is no evidence of this), these operations are inconsistent 
with its overall military strategy. 
 In addition to a misunderstanding of North Korean cyberspace capabilities and 
intent, some experts have noticed a trend of characterizing all offensive cyberspace 
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operations as sophisticated and suspect that it is an attempt to shift the blame for lapses in 
cybersecurity practices.177  
                                                 
177 Winkler, Ira. “The ‘Sophisticated Attack’ Myth.” Computer World, 10 February 2015. Web. 
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CHAPTER VII: DISCUSSION 
 
National Security Implications 
 The greatest threat from North Korea in cyberspace currently is its capability not 
its intent. As mentioned, threat is a combination of capability and intent. North Korea has 
demonstrated the capability to conduct offensive cyberspace operations and cyber 
espionage against both government and civilian targets. It has also dedicated resources 
toward developing and enhancing this capability. However, the operations have been 
consistent with an overall military strategy that consists of rhetoric and confrontation that 
is below the threshold for an act of war. Cyberwarfare is simply another form of 
asymmetric warfare. Even in the most alarmist scenario, if North Korea wanted to cause 
damage or destruction to critical infrastructure in South Korea, there is no reason it could 
not have done this already through traditional covert means, even despite the benefit of 
anonymity offered by cyberspace operations. 
 North Korea is not the greatest threat to the United States in cyberspace. North 
Korea is often referenced along with Russia and China as being among the most serious 
threats to the United States in cyberspace. In the assessment of cyberpower, Clark listed it 
first among the three nations and Valeriano and Maness listed it third among the three 
nations. According to the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence 
Community, “[North Korea] probably remains capable and willing to launch disruptive or 
destructive offensive cyberspace operations to support its political goals.”178 However, as 
                                                 
178 Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence 
Community, by James Clapper. 9 February 2016. Web. 
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revealed in this thesis, the focus of the operations is South Korea, not the United States, 
and the effect of the operations has been limited. In contrast, however, Russia has 
demonstrated a willingness to target critical infrastructure in and conduct cyber espionage 
operations against the United States, and China as well has been successful in cyber 
espionage operations against the United States.179 
 North Korea’s cyberspace operations (or cyber weapons) are a complement to its 
nuclear weapons. The greatest North Korean activities of concern for the United States 
are cyberspace operations and nuclear weapon/ballistic missile development. Placing the 
threats that the respective weapons represent within an impact/probability chart or matrix, 
nuclear weapons exemplify a threat that is high-impact but low-probability, and cyber 
weapons exemplify a threat that is low-impact but high-probability. Nuclear weapons 
have an enormous destructive force that is kinetic and therefore high impact. However, 
because of this and the numerous uncertainties associated with the potential 
consequences for the actual use of nuclear weapons (the “threat that leaves something to 
chance” in theories of deterrence), they have a low probability of being used. 
 In contrast, almost all cyber weapons have a damaging or disrupting effect that is 
only virtual and therefore low-impact.180 However, because cyber weapons can be used to 
effect relatively quickly and anonymously, they have a high probability of being used. It 
is therefore reasonable to assume that absent some sort of existential threat, North Korea 
will maintain its use of cyberspace operations for OCO and CISR in the virtual world and 
its use of nuclear weapons for deterrence in the physical world. 
                                                 
179 Ibid. 
180 The obvious exception is Stuxnet, which did have an effect that was kinetic. 
85 
 Because North Korea values its ability to control cyberspace within North Korea 
and its ability to engage in cyberspace activities and operations from abroad, these assets 
are also valuable targets for the United States. According to an expert on North Korea, 
Jieun Baek, “[The erosion of control over information] is probably the biggest weakness 
that the government has. And that’s evident because of the way they react to foreign 
information coming in, versus other threats like economic sanctions or verbal 
condemnations by other countries.”181 Because of its expansive and interconnected 
nature, which allows for the greater flow of information, the inability to control 
cyberspace represents a serious threat to the North Korean regime. The implications for 
even limited (yet legal) means of information flow between North Korean citizens via 
even domestic cyberspace, such as mobile phone, are significant. Such means allow for 
greater interpersonal communication and the formation of constituencies that are able to 
bring pressure on the regime.182 This forces the regime to reconsider its approach of 
control through individual isolation and creates the protentional for positive change.183 
 In addition, there has often been a disconnect between the goals for United States 
national security policy regarding North Korea and the instruments of state power that 
can be used to achieve these goals. That is, the United States wants North Korea to 
abandon its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development but has relied only on 
diplomatic and/or economic instruments, such as negotiations and sanctions. Due to the 
physical risks of retaliation and escalation, the traditional military threat cannot be 
                                                 
181 Baek, Jieun. "How Media Smuggling Took Hold in North Korea." Interview. PBS, 18 December 2016. 
Web. 
182 Kretchun, Nat. “The Regime Strikes Back: A New Era of North Korean Information Controls.” 38 
North, 9 June 2017. Web. 
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addressed with a traditional military response. In contrast, a cyberspace threat has no 
such physical risks, and can therefore be addressed with a cyberspace response, as well as 
diplomatic and economic responses. Because the locations abroad from which North 
Korea engages in cyberspace activities and operations also likely have dual purposes 
(economic and military), eliminating the ability to use these locations denies North Korea 
the resources and capabilities required to leverage multiple instruments of state power. 
For these reasons, the aforementioned assets related to North Korea in cyberspace are 
valuable to the United States as potential targets for leveraging its own instruments of 
state power to advance its national security and foreign policy goals. 
 
Policy Recommendations 
 Before offering policy recommendations, it is necessary to review the current 
United States strategies related to cyberspace. These can be broadly divided into 
diplomatic strategy and military strategy. For the former, according the International 
Strategy for Cyberspace released by the White House in 2011:184 
 
The United States will work internationally to promote an open, interoperable, 
secure, and reliable information and communications infrastructure that supports 
international trade and commerce, strengthens international security, and fosters 
free expression and innovation. To achieve that goal, we will build and sustain an 
environment in which norms of responsible behavior guide state actions, sustain 
partnerships, and support the rule of law in cyberspace. 
 
For the latter, the DOD has declared five strategic goals:185 
1. Build and maintain ready forces and capabilities to conduct cyberspace 
operations; 
                                                 
184 Office of the President of the United States. International Strategy for Cyberspace, May 2011. Web. 
185 Department of Defense. The DOD Cyber Strategy, April 2015. Web. 
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2. Defend the DOD information network, secure DOD data, and mitigate risks to 
DOD missions; 
 
3. Be prepared to defend the US homeland and US vital interests from disruptive 
or destructive cyberattacks of significant consequence; 
 
4. Build and maintain viable cyber options and plan to use those options to 
control conflict escalation and to shape the conflict environment at all stages; 
 
5. Build and maintain robust international alliances and partnerships to deter 
shared threats and increase international security and stability. 
 
 The United States government should focus on denying and disrupting the use of 
cyberspace by covert cyber units outside of North Korea. Because the systems and 
networks outside of North Korea are dependent on the use of host nation infrastructure 
and compliance with host nation regulation, they are more vulnerable. Because these 
locations provide greater capacity and anonymity, they also are likely more valuable to 
the North Korea regime. There are two options suggested for this denial and disruption. 
The first is directly through offensive cyberspace operations, which would neutralize a 
node from the network of units that support the system of cyberspace operations. The 
second is indirectly through the conclusion of an agreement or a treaty that codifies 
international norms prohibiting the conduct of certain types of operations against certain 
types of targets, which would neutralize the node by obligating the host nation to address 
cyber harm emanating from within its territory. Even if the node is not neutralized due to 
the inability or unwillingness of the host nation, an agreement or a treaty at least alters 
the properties of the system of regulations and creates a difficult operating environment 
for the unit. These two options are potentially mutually exclusive. 
 A response has already been made against North Korean cyberspace assets, albeit 
in the context of counterproliferation. In June 2017, the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
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at the Department of the Treasury added the KCC to the list of designation entities for 
sanctions due its role in earning foreign money for the regime and the Munitions Industry 
Department in particular, which is involved in key aspects of the ballistic missile 
development program.186 As such, expanding sanctions to include any North Korean 
entity associated with malicious cyberspace activities or operations represents a third 
option.  
 The United States government should focus on enabling and ensuring the less 
monitored and less controlled use of cyberspace by civilians inside of North Korea. 
Cyberspace operations against strategic programs have been unsuccessful at noticeably 
deterring or even delaying the progression of these programs. This does not mean, 
however, that North Korea is invulnerable to such operations. It means only that those 
specific programs are. The aforementioned vulnerability to information other than state-
sanctioned media has already been exploited for use by the human network of illicit 
storage mediums that are smuggled into and out of North Korea. Assuming that a greater 
flow of information equates to a greater chance for change in regime behavior, the asset 
of monitoring and control is worth targeting. Providing access to information could be 
accomplished by supporting the efforts of non-governmental organizations to get 
CDs/DVDs, USB flash drives, and SD cards into North Korea. This access could then be 
assured by initiating efforts to defeat or circumvent the software placed on the devices, 
systems, and networks by the North Korean government. 
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 Such cyberspace operations could even occur within a more comprehensive and 
more active information operation campaign. After the flow of and access to information 
has been increased in North Korea, the United States could release public information 
that is truthful yet damaging to the legitimacy and credibility of the regime. The duration 
and intensity of this campaign could be tailored to act either as a means of deterrence in 
cyberspace, signaling the capability of the United States to disrupt regime control, or as a 
means of destabilization. 
 The United States government should enhance information and intelligence 
sharing with allies and partners, as well as with civilian entities. As revealed in the 
analysis of cyberspace operations by North Korea, the threat is comprised of multiple 
pieces of a puzzle. Different pieces of evidence can be left behind on different private and 
government systems and networks. Different series of operations against private and 
government targets in the United States and other countries can be connected to reveal a 
greater scope and intensity that is otherwise not obvious from an individual operation. It 
is all this evidence that completes the puzzle of the actual cyberspace capabilities and 
intent of an adversary. 
 Some executive efforts to enhance information and intelligence sharing have been 
made. For example, The DHS established the United States Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team (US-CERT) in 2003 to collect, analyze, and disseminate cybersecurity 
information shared among private and government entities. However, legislative efforts 
have lagged. The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA) passed the 
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House of Representatives but not the Senate in 2013.187 Despite concerns over liability 
and anonymity, the alternate Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) was signed 
into law in 2015. However, although CISA facilitates information sharing, it does not 
require information sharing. There are also no provisions in executive agreements or 
treaties or in legislative acts that establish means of or obligation for information and 
intelligence sharing between allies and partners. These are significant missing pieces of 
the puzzle that need to be addressed. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
 There are three directions for future research that are best captured in the 
following questions: (1) What are the nuanced differences in effects or consequences 
between exploitative cyber incidents and disruptive cyber incidents? (2) How does the 
analysis of cyber events in this thesis compare to the analysis in the updated DCIDD 
expected to be released soon after the thesis is completed? What are the implications for 
national security if North Korea is engaged in cybercrime? 
 As mentioned earlier, exploitative incidents and disruptive incidents differ in 
regard to ultimate effect. However, this is not reflected in the factor of severity in the 
DCIDD. If the ultimate consequence is different, then is it reasonable to assume that the 
implication for national security will be different. Recognizing the importance of this 
distinction, the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland has published a 
framework for categorizing and assessing the severity of disruptive cyber incidents and is 
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finalizing a separate framework for exploitative cyber incidents.188 It is also worth 
considering consequences that are not only operational or economic (as was done in this 
thesis), but also psychological. That is, do North Korean cyberspace operations have 
consequences that are psychological and what are the implications for national security? 
 Of the fourteen dyadic cyber events in the DCIDD that identified North Korea as 
the perpetrator, seven were unable to be found and one was omitted because although the 
indicated event did occur, no confirmation was found for one of the three targets. In 
addition to these discrepancies, for the remaining six dyadic cyber events that overlapped 
between the DCIDD and this thesis, there were minor discrepancies for the coding of 
some of the factors. Because of this, it possible that there will be similar discrepancies in 
comparison to the updated DCIDD that are worth addressing.  
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